Below is the description of and schedule for my seminar on “Public Reason” (spring term 2020). The seminar includes both graduate (MA) students and advanced undergraduate students.
I’m trying to finish up a draft of a book on public reason, so a few of the readings are from that.
If you have any suggestions for additional optional readings please let me know (ideally in the “comments” below).
Course Overview
Citizens in contemporary societies endorse a plurality of religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines. This pluralism cannot be eliminated without the exercise of politically oppressive power—something that liberalism’s principle of toleration rules out. Yet accommodating this pluralism seems to threaten the ideal of consensual democratic decision-making. This is because decisions regarding deeply contested political issues—for instance, what the laws should be concerning abortion, education, or physician-assisted suicide—seem to involve citizens imposing political positions drawn from their respective religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines upon one another. In recent decades, however, the idea of ‘public reason’ has been developed to explain how citizens within pluralist societies can make
mutually acceptable political decisions. The idea of public reason thus purports to harmonize the principle of liberal toleration with the ideal of democratic self-government.
This course will explore John Rawls’s influential ‘political liberal’ account of public reason. According Rawls and other political liberals, public reasons are reasons that reasonable citizens
agree should be used to decide fundamental political questions. By means of public reasoning, all reasonable citizens can become politically autonomous. We also will consider the ‘convergence’ account of public justification that has been developed in recent years by Gerald Gaus and his students. According to the convergence account of public justification, the reasons that citizens should use to decide political questions need not be acceptable to all so long as those reasons converge in support of common political decisions.
The implications of Rawlsian public reason and Gausian convergence justification for thinking about political justice will be considered. Whereas the political liberal account of public reasoning aims to support egalitarian conceptions of justice—indeed, it developed out of Rawls’s concern with the realization of his conception of ‘justice as fairness’ under conditions of reasonable pluralism—the convergence account of public justification purportedly ‘tilts’ towards classical liberalism. We also will consider feminist and religious objections to the idea of public reason. The possibility of a ‘political liberal feminism’ will be discussed. Finally, the educational implications of the idea of public reason will be explored.
Course
Schedule
0. Introductory
meeting (January 23rd)
Required
readings:
o None.
Optional
reading:
o
L. Wenar (2017) “John Rawls,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
§§1-4.
1. Justice as Fairness in A Theory of Justice (January
28th & 30th)
Required readings:
o
J. Rawls (1999) A Theory of
Justice: Revised Edition (Harvard Univ. Press):
§ From Part One:
§§1-4, 11, 20, 24, 26 (i.e., pp.3-19, 52-56, 102-105, 118-123, 130-139).
§ From Part Two: §40
(i.e., pp.221-227).
Optional readings:
o
S. Freeman (2002) “John Rawls – An Overview,” in S. Freeman (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls
(Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-61.
o
S. Freeman (2008) “Original Position,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, §§1-6 (accessible at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/).
o J. Rawls (1999) A Theory of Justice, chapter VII (can skip §62).
o S. Darwall (1976), “A
Defense of the Kantian Interpretation,” Ethics
86: 164-170.
2. Stability in A Theory of Justice (February 4th
& 6th)
Required readings:
o
J. Rawls (1999) A Theory of
Justice: Revised Edition (Harvard Univ. Press):
§ From Part Three:
chapters VIII and IX (i.e., pp.397-514).
Recommended reading:
o P. Weithman (2010) Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s
Political Turn (Oxford University Press), chapter II (pp.42-67).
Optional reading:
o S. Freeman (2003),
“Congruence and the Good of Justice,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press), pp. 277-315.
3. Political liberalism and the Idea of Public Reason
(February 11th & 13th)
Required readings:
o
J. Rawls (2005), Political
Liberalism: Expanded Edition (Columbia University Press), “Introduction to
the Paperback Edition” (pp.xxxv-lx).
o
J.
Rawls (1997) “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review 64/3: 765-807.
§ Republished in: J. Rawls (2005), Political Liberalism, pp.440-490.
o
B.
Neufeld (2020) “Political Liberalism and Public Reason: The Main Elements”
(Chapter 1 of draft manuscript, Public
Reason: A Critical Introduction).
Recommended reading:
o J. Rawls (1995) “Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy 92: 132-80.
§ Republished in: J. Rawls (2005), Political Liberalism, pp.372-434.
Optional readings:
o J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press), Part
I (esp. pp.1-38).
o J. Rawls (2005) Political Liberalism, Lectures I, II, III, IV, VI.
o B. Barry (1995), “John
Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics
105: 874-915.
o G. Badano and M. Bonotti
(2019) “Rescuing Public Reason Liberalism’s Accessibility Requirement” Law and Philosophy (forthcoming).
o B. Dreben (2002), “On
Rawls and Political Liberalism,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press), pp. 316-346.
o G. Gaus and C. Van Schoelandt (2017)
“Consensus on What? Convergence for What? Four Models of Political Liberalism,”
Ethics 128: 145-172.
o J. Habermas (1995) “Reconciliation
Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political
Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 92:
109-131.
o L. Krasnoff (1998),
“Consensus, Stability and Normativity in Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The
Journal of Philosophy 95: 269-292.
o C. Larmore (2002), “Public
Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Rawls (CUP), pp. 368-393.
o R. Martin (2014) “Overlapping
Consensus,” in J. Mandel and D.A. Reidy (eds.) A Companion to Rawls (Wiley Blackwell), pp. 281-297.
o J. Quong (2014) “On the Idea of Public Reason,” in J.
Mandle and D. Reidy (eds.) A Companion to
Rawls (Wiley Blackwell), pp. 265–280
o M. Schwartzman (2004) “The Completeness
of Public Reason,” Politics, Philosophy
& Economics 3, pp.191-200.
o M. Schwartzman (2011) “The Sincerity of
Public Reason,” Journal of Political
Philosophy 19: 375-398.
o P. Weithman, Why Political Liberalism, Introduction, Chapters VIII, IX, X.
o L. Wenar (1995) “Political Liberalism:
An Internal Critique,” Ethics 106: 32-62.
4. Justifying Public Reason (a): Respect and
Friendship (February 18th & 20th)
Required readings:
o
C. Larmore (1999), “The Moral Basis of Political
Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy
94, pp. 599-625.
§ [Also in
C. Larmore (2008), The Autonomy of
Morality (CUP).]
o
K.
Ebels-Duggan (2010) “The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement,”
The Philosophical Quarterly 60: 50-71.
o
R.J. Leland (2019) “Civic Friendship, Public Reason,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 47:
72-103.
Recommended readings:
o J. Boettcher (2007), “Respect,
Recognition, and Public Reason,” Social
Theory and Practice 33: 223-249.
o J. Boettcher (2012), “The Moral Status
of Public Reason,” The Journal of
Political Philosophy 20: 156-177.
o
S.
Darwall
(1977) “Two Kinds of Respect,” in Ethics 88: 36-49.
o C. Larmore (2015)
“Political Liberalism: Its Motivations and Goals,” Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy 1, pp.63-88.
o R.J.
Leland and Han van Wietmarschen, “Political Liberalism and Political
Community,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 14, no. 2 (2017): 142–67
Optional readings:
o C. Bird (2014) “Coercion and Public
Justification,” Politics, Philosophy
& Economics 13: 189-214.
o I. Carter (2011), “Respect
and the Basis of Equality,” Ethics
121: 538-71.
o A. Lister (2008) “Public Reason and
Democracy,” Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy 11/3: 273-289.
o A. Lister (2013) Public Reason and Political Community (London: Bloomsbury),
especially ch.5.
o A. Lister (2017) “Public Reason and
Reciprocity,” Journal of Political
Philosophy 25: 155-172.
o S. Macedo and G. Hadfield
(2012) “Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason,” Law & Ethics of Human Rights 6:
7-46.
o B. Neufeld (2005), “Civic Respect,
Political Liberalism, and Non-Liberal Societies,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 4: 275-299.
o M. Nussbaum (2011), “Perfectionist
Liberalism and Political Liberalism,” Philosophy
& Public Affairs 39: 3-45.
o J. Quong (2011) Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
esp. ch.5.
o C.
Van Schoelandt (2015) “Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public
Reason,” Philosophical Studies, 172:
1031–50
5. Justifying Public Reason (b): Political
Autonomy (February 25th & 27th)
Required readings:
o
P. Weithman (2010), Why Political Liberalism?
Ch. XI (pp. 344-369).
o
P.
Weithman (2017) “Autonomy and Disagreement about Justice in Political Liberalism,” Ethics 128: 95-122.
o
B. Neufeld (2020), Public Reason:
A Critical Introduction, Chapters 2 and 5 [except for the section on “Convergence Public Justification” in
ch.2] (Draft manuscript).
Recommended readings:
o P. Weithman (2017) “In Defense of
Political Liberalism,” Philosophy &
Public Affairs 45: 397-412.
o B. Neufeld (2019) “Shared intentions, Public reason, and
Political Autonomy,” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 49: 776-804
6. Political
Liberalism and Feminism (a) (March 3rd & 5th)
Required readings:
o
Re-read:
§ J. Rawls
(1997/2005) “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” §5.
o
Susan M. Okin (2005) “‘Forty Acres and a Mule’ for
Women: Rawls and Feminism,” Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 4: 233-248.
o
Gina Schouten (2013) “Restricting Justice:
Political Intervention in the Home and in the Market,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41: 357-388.
Recommended readings:
o
Amy Baehr (2008) “Perfectionism, Feminism and
Public Reason,” Law and Philosophy
27: 193-222.
o
Amy Baehr (2017) “A Capacious Account of Liberal
Feminism,” Feminist Philosophy Quarterly
3, (1). Article 4. doi:10.5206/fpq/ 2016.3.4.
o
S. M. Okin (1989) Justice, Gender, and the Family (Basic Books), Chs. 5 & 8.
o
S. M. Okin (1994) “Political Liberalism, Justice
and Gender,” Ethics 105: 23-43.
Optional readings:
o
R. Abbey (2007) “Back Toward a Comprehensive
Liberalism? Justice as Fairness, Gender, and Families,” Political Theory 35: 5-28.
o
C. Brettschneider (2007) “The Politics of the
Personal: A Liberal Approach,” American
Political Science Review 101: 19-31.
o
A. Laden (2003), “Radical Liberals, Reasonable
Feminists: Reason, Power and Objectivity in MacKinnon and Rawls,” Journal of Political Philosophy 11:
133–152.
o
A. Levey (2005) “Liberalism, Adaptive Preferences
and Gender Equality,” Hypatia 20: 127-143.
o
S. A. Lloyd (1994) “Family Justice and Social
Justice,” Pacific Philos. Quarterly
75: 353-71.
o
S. A. Lloyd (2004) “Toward a Liberal Theory of
Sexual Equality,” in A. R. Baehr, ed., Varieties
of Feminist Liberalism (Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 63-84.B.
o Neufeld and C. Van Schoelandt (2014). “Political Liberalism, Ethos Justice, and Gender Equality,” Law and Philosophy 33: 75-104.
o B. Neufeld (2009) “Coercion, the Basic Structure,
and the Family,” Journal of Social
Philosophy 40: 37-54.
o
B. Neufeld (2011) “Susan Okin,” in D. K.
Chatterjee, ed., Encyclopedia of Global
Justice (Springer), 780-783 (read only the first two sections).
o
Martha Nussbaum (2003) “Rawls and Feminism,” in S.
Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Rawls (Cambridge University Press).
o
Gina Schouten (2017) “Citizenship, Reciprocity, and
the Gendered Division of Labor: A Stability Argument for Gender Egalitarian
Political Interventions, Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 16/2: 174-209.
o
Gina Schouten (2019) Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor (Oxford
University Press).
o
Kimberly Yuracko (2003) Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press).
o
Kimberly Yuracko (1995) “Toward Feminist
Perfectionism: A Radical Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism,” UCLA Women’s Law Journal 6:1–48.
7. Political Liberalism and Feminism (b) (March 10th)
[No class on the 12th]
Required readings:
o Lori Watson and Christie Hartley (2018)
Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A
Feminist Political Liberalism (Oxford University Press), Chapters 1 and 6 (pp.15-39,
135-166).
Recommended readings:
o Watson & Hartley (2018),
Introduction (pp.1-12), Chapters 2-4 (pp.40-105).
8. Political Liberalism and Feminism (c) (March 24th
& 26th)
Required readings:
o E. Edenberg (2018) “Growing Up Sexist:
Challenges to Rawlsian Stability,” Law
and Philosophy 37: 577-612.
o E. Edenberg (2020) “Two Senses of
Reasonable” (draft manuscript).
v Note: Prof. Edenberg will take part in our March 26th
discussion.
Recommended reading:
o L. Wenar (1995) “Political Liberalism:
An Internal Critique,” Ethics 106:
32-62.
Optional readings:
o J. Boettcher (2007), “Respect,
Recognition, and Public Reason,” Social
Theory and Practice 33: 223-249.
o J. Boettcher (2012), “The Moral Status
of Public Reason,” The Journal of
Political Philosophy 20: 156-177.
o
S.
Darwall
(1977) “Two Kinds of Respect,” in Ethics 88: 36-49.
o
C. McMahon (2014) “Rawls, Reciprocity, and
the Barely Reasonable,” Utilitas 26: 1-22.
9. Convergence Public Justification (March 31st
and April 2nd)
Required readings:
o G. Gaus and K. Vallier (2009) “The
Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications
of Convergence, Asymmetry, and Political Institutions,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 35: 51-76.
o G. Gaus (2010)
“Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State: Justificatory Liberalism’s
Classical Tilt,” Social Philosophy &
Policy 27: 233-75.
o K. Vallier
(2015) “Public Justification versus Public
Deliberation: The Case for Divorce,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45:
139–158.
Recommended reading:
o
P. Billingham (2016) “Convergence Justifications Within Political
Liberalism: A Defence,” Res Publica 22: 135–153.
Optional readings:
o G. Gaus (2010) “On Two Critics of
Justificatory Liberalism: A Response to Wall and Lister,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 9, pp.177-212.
o
G. Gaus (2011), The Order of
Public Reason (Cambridge University Press).
o A. Lister (2010) “Public Justification
and the Limits of State Action,” Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 9, pp.151-175.
o
K. Vallier (2014) Liberal Politics
and Public Faith (Routledge).
o
K. Vallier (2019) Must Politics Be
War? (Oxford University Press).
10. Debating Convergence Liberalism’s ‘Classical
Tilt’ (April 7th) [No class
on the 9th]
Required readings:
o A. Lister (2012) “The
Classical Tilt of Justificatory Liberalism,” European Journal of Political Theory 12, pp.316-326.
o J. Boettcher (2014)
“Against the Asymmetric Convergence Model of Public Justification,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
(online early version: DOI 10.1007/s10677-014-9519-7).
o K. Vallier (2016) “In
Defense of the Asymmetric Convergence Model of Public Justification,” Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 19, pp.255-266.
Optional readings:
o G.A. Cohen (2011) “Freedom and Money”
in G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of
Egalitarian Justice (Princeton University Press), pp.166-99.
o M. Lister (2011) “Review of The Order of Public Reason,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
(especially the final 7 paragraphs [from “In the final section of the book…”
onwards].)
o J. Reiman (2012) As
Free and as Just as Possible: A Theory of Marxian Liberalism (Wiley).
11. Convergence Public Justification: Democracy
& Autonomy (April 14th & 16th)
Required readings:
o J. Boettcher (2019) “Deliberative
Democracy, Diversity, and Restraint,” Res
Publica (pre-print version).
o P. Billingham (2016)
“Convergence Justifications Within Political Liberalism: A Defence,” Res
Publica 22: 135–153.
o B. Neufeld (2020) Public Reason: A Critical Introduction (draft manuscript), Chapter
2, section on “Convergence Public Justification.”
Recommended readings:
o
P.
Weithman (2011) “Convergence and Political Autonomy,” Public Affairs Quarterly 25, pp.327-348.
o
B. Wong (2019) “Accessibility, Pluralism, and Honesty: A Defense of the
Accessibility Requirement in Public Justification,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
(forthcoming).
12. Public Reason and Citizens of Faith (April 21st
& 23rd)
Required readings:
o N. Wolterstorff (1997) “Why We Should
Reject What Liberalism Tells Us About Speaking and Acting in Public for
Religious Reasons,” in P. Weithman (ed.) Religion
and Contemporary Liberalism (Univ. of Notre Dame Press), pp.162-181.
o K. Vallier (2012) “Liberalism, Religion
and Integrity,” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 90, pp.149-165.
o Aurélia Bardon (2018) “Two
Misunderstandings About Public Justification and Religious Reasons,” Law and Philosophy 37: 639-669.
Recommended readings:
o C. Hartley and L. Watson (2018) Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A
Feminist Political Liberalism (OUP), chapters 3, 4, and 5.
o P. Weithman (2015) “Inclusivism,
Stability, and Assurance,” in T. Bailey and V. Gentile (eds.) Rawls and Religion (Columbia University
Press), pp.75-96.
Optional readings:
o M. Clayton and D. Stevens (2014) “When
God Commands Disobedience: Political Liberalism and Unreasonable Religions,” Res Publica 20: 65-84.
o M. Clayton and D. Stevens (2019)
“Further Thoughts on Talking to the Unreasonable: A Response to Wong,” Res Publica 25: 273-281.
o C. Eberle (2002) Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press), esp. pp.294-330.
o A. March (2015) “Rethinking the Public
Use of Religious Reasons,” in T. Baily and V. Gentile (eds.) Rawls and Religion (Columbia University
Press), pp.97-132.
o P. Quinn (1997) “Political Liberalisms
and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” in P. Weithman (ed.) Religion and Contemporary Liberalism
(Univ. of Notre Dame Press), pp.138-61.
o J. Quong, “Comments on Kevin Vallier’s Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond
Separation” (unpublished APA commentary).
o M. Schwartzman (2012) “The Ethics of
Reasoning from Conjecture,” Journal of
Moral Philosophy 9: 521-544.
o M. Schwartzman (2012) “What If Religion
is Not Special?” University of Chicago
Law Review 79: 1351-1427.
o K. Vallier (2014) Liberal Politics and Public Faith (Routledge), pp.45-82.
o N. Wolterstorff (2007) “The Paradoxical
Role of Coercion in the Theory of Political Liberalism,” Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture 1, pp.101-25
o B. Wong (2019) “Conjecture and the
Division of Justificatory Labour: A Comment on Clayton and Stevens,” Res Publica 25: 119-125.
13. Two Criticisms of Public Reason: Self-Defeat
and Political Disengagement
(April 28th & 30th)
Required readings:
o D. Enoch (2015) “Against Public
Reason,” in D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, S. Wall (eds.) Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, volume 1, pp.112-142.
o A. Lister (2018) “The
Coherence of Public Reason,” Journal of
Moral Philosophy 15: 64-84.
o B. Neufeld (2020) Public Reason: A Critical Introduction (draft manuscript), chapter
3.
Recommended reading:
o B. Neufeld (2017) “Why Public Reasoning
Involves Ideal Theorizing,” in K. Vallier and M. Weber (eds.) Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates
(Oxford Univeristy Press), pp. 73-93 (especially § 3 [pp. 85-89]).
Optional readings: to be provided later.
14. Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education
(May 5th & 7th)
Required readings:
o A. Gutmann (1995) “Civic Education and
Social Diversity,” Ethics 105: 64-88.
o K. Vallier (2014) Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (Routledge), ch.7
(“Reconciliation in Policy – Public Education”), pp.225-254.
o B. Neufeld (2020) Public Reason: A Critical Introduction (draft), chapter 5.
Optional readings:
o
E. Callan (1996) “Political Liberalism and Political Education,”’ Review of Politics 58, pp.5-33.
o
E. Callan (1997) Creating
Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy (Oxford: OUP).
o
V.
M. Costa (2011) Rawls, Citizenship, and
Education (New York: Routledge).
o
S. De Wijze (1999) “Rawls and Civic Education,” Cogito 13: 87-93.
o
K.
Ebels-Duggan (2013) “Moral Education in the Liberal State,” Journal of Practical Ethics 1, pp.24-63.
o
E.
Edenberg (2016) “Civic Education: Political or Comprehensive?” in J. Drerup, et
al. (eds.) Justice, Education and the
Politics of Childhood (Springer), pp.187-206.
o
C. Fernández and M. Sundström (2011) “Citizenship Education and
Liberalism: A State of the Debate Analysis 1990-2010,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 30, pp.363-84.
o
S.
Macedo (2000) Diversity and Distrust:
Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Harvard University Press).
o B. Neufeld (2020) “Political
Liberalism, Autonomy, and Education,” in A. Peterson, G. Stahl, H. Soong (eds.)
The Palgrave Handbook of Citizenship and
Education (Palgrave Macmillan).
o B. Neufeld (2019) “Non-Domination and
Political Liberal Citizenship Education,” in C. Tappolet and C. Macleod (eds.) Philosophical Perspectives on Moral and
Civic Education (Routledge), pp.135-155.
o B. Neufeld (2013) “Political Liberalism
and Citizenship Education,” Philosophy
Compass 8/9, pp.781-797.
o G. Davis and B. Neufeld (2007)
“Political Liberalism, Civic Education, and Educational Choice,” Social Theory and Practice 43, pp.47-74.
o G. Schouten (2018) “Political Liberalism and Autonomy
Education: Are Citizenship-Based Arguments Enough?” Philosophical Studies 175: 1071-93.
