Of note are the numerous optional readings. I do not expect students to read most (if any) of them. I include them more for my own sake, to remind myself of relevant material at a glance so that I can advise (with no delay) students who wish to explore certain topics beyond the required readings.
I also should explain why I've included so many of my own articles. The reason is not (simply) arrogance. The seminar meets for 2.5 hours each week, and I usually lecture for the first hour. Since my lectures draw on my own work, I thought it reasonable to give students access to my 'lecture notes' on the relevant topics. Moreover, I'm currently writing a book on public reason, so I thought that I would encourage my students to respond critically to the articles that I'll be drawing upon for that book. Doing so has pedagogic merit, I think, for graduate students (as well as helping me!).
Finally, my apologies for the slightly wonky formatting of the reading schedule. In 'cutting-and-pasting' from my syllabus, some of the spacing got messed up. My attempts to fix it in Blogger made things even worse, so I've left it the way it is.
Okay, preliminary comments out of the way, below is the course description and reading schedule...
[A green Rawls somewhere in Quebec City (I think)]
Course Overview
Citizens in contemporary liberal democratic societies endorse a plurality of religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines. This pluralism cannot be eliminated without the exercise of politically oppressive power—something that liberalism’s principle of toleration rules out. Yet accommodating this pluralism seems to threaten the ideal of consensual democratic decision-making. This is because decisions regarding deeply contested political issues—for instance, what the laws should be concerning abortion, education, physician-assisted suicide, same-sex marriage, and so forth—seem to involve citizens imposing political positions drawn from their respective religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines upon one another. In recent decades, however, theories of ‘public reason’ have been developed to explain how citizens within pluralist societies can make mutually acceptable political decisions. The idea of public reason thus purports to harmonize the principle of liberal toleration with the ideal of democratic self-government.
This course will explore the two most influential contemporary accounts of public reason. The first is the ‘consensus’ account of John Rawls, according to which public reasons are reasons that reasonable citizens agree should apply to their common political and economic institutions. The second is the ‘convergence’ account of Gerald Gaus, according to which the reasons that citizens should use to decide political questions need not be shared so long as those reasons converge in support of common political decisions. Some of the main criticisms of both accounts of public reason also will be discussed. We will conclude by considering briefly some of the educational implications of ‘public reason liberalism.’
Schedule of Required Readings
0. Introductory
Meeting (Jan. 26th)
Required readings:
o No required readings.
Optional readings:
o J. Quong (2013) “Public
Reason,” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (accessible at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/public-reason/).
o K. Vallier and F.
D’Agostine (2013) “Public Justification,” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (accessible at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-public/).
o L. Wenar (2017) “John
Rawls,” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, §§1-4 (accessible at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/).
o B. Neufeld (2015) “Public Reason,” in
J. Mandle and D. Reidy (eds.) The
Cambridge Rawls Lexicon (Cambridge University Press), pp.666-672.
1. Justice
as Fairness and its Stability (Feb. 2nd)
Required readings:
o
J. Rawls (1999) A Theory of
Justice: Revised Edition (Harvard Univ. Press):
§ From Part One:
§§1-4, 11, 20, 24, 26 (i.e., pp.3-19, 52-56, 102-105, 118-123, 130-139).
§ From Part Two: §40 (i.e.,
pp.221-227).
§ From Part Three:
chapters VIII and IX (i.e., pp.397-514).
Optional readings:
o
S. Freeman (2008) “Original Position,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, §§1-6 (accessible at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/).
o J. Rawls (1999) A Theory of Justice, chapter VII (can skip §62).
o
P. Weithman (2010) Why Political
Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (Oxford University Press),
chapter II (pp.42-67).
2. Political
Liberalism and the Idea of Public Reason (Feb. 9th)
Required readings:
o
J. Rawls (2005), Political
Liberalism: Expanded Edition (Columbia University Press), “Introduction to
the Paperback Edition” (pp.xxxv-lx).
o
J.
Rawls (1997) “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review 64/3: 765-807.
§ Republished in: J. Rawls (2005), Political Liberalism, pp.440-490.
Recommended reading (required
for graduate students):
o J. Rawls (1995) “Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy 92/3: 132-180.
§ Republished in: J. Rawls (2005), Political Liberalism, pp.372-434.
Optional readings:
o J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press), Part
I (esp. pp.1-38).
o J. Rawls (2005) Political Liberalism, Lectures I, II, III, IV, VI.
o B. Barry (1995), “John
Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics
105, pp.874-915.
o B. Dreben (2003), “On
Rawls and Political Liberalism,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press), pp. 316-346.
o G. Gaus (2014) “The Turn to Political
Liberalism,” in J. Mandle and D. Reidy (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Rawls (Wiley-Blackwell), pp.235-50.
o J. Habermas (1995) “Reconciliation
Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,”
The Journal of Philosophy 92,
pp.109-131.
o L. Krasnoff (1998),
“Consensus, Stability and Normativity in Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The
Journal of Philosophy 95, pp.269-292.
o M. Nussbaum (2015) “Introduction,” in
T. Brooks and M. Nussbaum (eds.) Rawls’s
Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press), pp.1-56.
o M. Schwartzman (2004) “The Completeness
of Public Reason,” Politics, Philosophy
& Economics 3, pp.191-200.
o P. Weithman, Why Political Liberalism, Introduction (pp.3-16), Ch. I (pp.17-41).
o L. Wenar (1995) “Political Liberalism:
An Internal Critique,” Ethics 106,
pp.32-62.
3. Justifying
Public Reason (Feb. 16th)
Required readings:
o
C. Larmore (1999), “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 94, pp.
599-625.
§ [Also in C. Larmore
(2008), The Autonomy of Morality
(CUP)]
o
P. Weithman (2010), Why Political
Liberalism? Ch. XI (pp. 344-369).
o
B. Neufeld (2011), “Review of Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?” Notre
Dame Philosophical Reviews, especially part II (accessible at
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/27634-why-political-liberalism-on-john-rawls-s-political-turn/).
o
K.
Ebels-Duggan (2010) “The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of
Disagreement,” The Philosophical
Quarterly 60, pp.50-71.
Recommended reading:
o
C. Larmore (2015) “Political Liberalism: Its Motivations and Goals,” Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy
1, pp.63-88.
Optional readings:
o C. Bird (2014) “Coercion and Public
Justification,” Politics, Philosophy
& Economics 13, pp.189-214.
o J. Boettcher (2007), “Respect,
Recognition, and Public Reason,” Social
Theory and Practice 33, pp.223-249.
o J. Boettcher (2012), “The Moral Status
of Public Reason,” The Journal of
Political Philosophy 20, pp.156-177.
o I. Carter (2011), “Respect
and the Basis of Equality,” Ethics
121, pp.538-571.
o
L. Krasnoff (1998), “Consensus, Stability and Normativity in Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 95, pp.
269-292.
o A. Lister (2013) Public Reason and Political Community (London: Bloomsbury),
especially ch.5.
o B. Neufeld (2005), “Civic Respect,
Political Liberalism, and Non-Liberal Societies,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 4, pp.275-299.
o M. Nussbaum (2011), “Perfectionist
Liberalism and Political Liberalism,” Philosophy
& Public Affairs 39, pp.3-45.
o J. Quong (2011) Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
esp. ch.5.
4. Public
Reason and Feminism (Feb. 23rd)
Required readings:
o
Re-read:
§ J. Rawls (1997/2005) “The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited,” §5 (Rawls’s discussion of the family).
o Susan M. Okin (2005) “‘Forty Acres and
a Mule’ for Women: Rawls and Feminism,” Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 4, pp.233-248.
o
Amy Baehr (2008), “Perfectionism, Feminism and Public Reason,” Law and Philosophy 27, pp. 193-222.
o
B.
Neufeld and C.V. Schoelandt (2014). “Political Liberalism, Ethos Justice, and
Gender Equality,” Law and Philosophy
33, pp.75-104.
Recommended reading:
o
C. Hartley and L. Watson (2009), “Feminism, Religion, and Shared
Reasons: A Defense of Exclusive Public Reason,” Law and Philosophy 28, pp. 493-536.
Optional readings:
o R. Abbey (2007) “Back Toward a
Comprehensive Liberalism? Justice as Fairness, Gender, and Families,” Political Theory 35, pp.5-28.
o C. Brettschneider (2007) “The Politics
of the Personal: A Liberal Approach,” American
Political Science Review 101: 19-31.
o Christie Hartley and Lori
Watson, “Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?” Journal of Ethics
& Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org, (2010), 5/1.
o A. Levey (2005) “Liberalism, Adaptive
Preferences and Gender Equality,” Hypatia
20, pp.127-143.
o S. A. Lloyd (1994) “Family Justice and
Social Justice,” Pacific Philos. Quarterly
75: 353-71.
o S. A. Lloyd (2004) “Toward a Liberal
Theory of Sexual Equality,” in A. R. Baehr, ed., Varieties of Feminist Liberalism (Rowman & Littlefield), pp.
63-84.
o B. Neufeld (2009) “Coercion, the Basic
Structure, and the Family,” Journal of Social
Philosophy 40: 37-54.
o B. Neufeld (2011) “Susan Okin,” in D.
K. Chatterjee, ed., Encyclopedia of
Global Justice (Springer), 780-783 (read only the first two sections).
o Martha Nussbaum (2003) “Rawls and
Feminism,” in S. Freeman, ed., The
Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press).
o S. Okin (1989) Justice, Gender, and the Family (Basic Books), Chs. 5 & 8.
o S. Okin (1994) “Political Liberalism,
Justice and Gender,” Ethics 105,
pp.23-43.
o G. Schouten (2013) “Restricting
Justice: Political Intervention in the Home and in the Market,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41, pp.
357-388.
5. Public
Reason and Religion (March 2nd)
Required readings:
o N. Wolterstorff (1997) “Why We Should
Reject What Liberalism Tells Us About Speaking and Acting in Public for
Religious Reasons,” in P. Weithman (ed.) Religion
and Contemporary Liberalism (Univ. of Notre Dame Press), pp.162-181.
o K. Vallier (2012) “Liberalism, Religion
and Integrity,” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 90, pp.149-165.
o C. Hartley and L. Watson (2017) “The
Integrity Objection and the Case for Restraint” (draft chapter in Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A
Feminist Political Liberalism [Oxford University Press]).
Optional readings:
o C. Eberle (2002) Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press), esp. pp.294-330.
o A. March (2015) “Rethinking the Public
Use of Religious Reasons,” in T. Baily and V. Gentile (eds.) Rawls and Religion (Columbia University
Press), pp.97-132.
o P. Quinn (1997) “Political Liberalisms
and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” in P. Weithman (ed.) Religion and Contemporary Liberalism
(Univ. of Notre Dame Press), pp.138-61.
o J. Quong, “Comments on Kevin Vallier’s Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond
Separation” (unpublished APA commentary).
o K. Vallier (2014) Liberal Politics and Public Faith (Routledge), pp.45-82.
o P. Weithman (2015) “Inclusivism,
Stability, Assurance,” in T. Bailey and V. Gentile (eds.) Rawls and Religion (Columbia University Press), pp.75-96.
o N. Wolterstorff (2007) “The Paradoxical
Role of Coercion in the Theory of Political Liberalism,” Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture 1, pp.101-25
6. Public Reason and the Truth (March 9th)
Required readings:
· J. Raz (1998) “Disagreement in
Politics,” American Journal of
Jurisprudence 43, pp.25-52.
· S. Freeman (2007) “Public Reason and
Political Justification,” in Justice and
the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy (Oxford
University Press), pp.215-256.
·
D. Estlund (1998), “The Insularity of the Reasonable: Why Political
Liberalism Must Admit the Truth,” Ethics
108, pp. 252–75.
Optional readings:
·
J. Cohen (2009), “Truth and Public Reason,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, pp. 2-42.
·
J. Quong (2011) Liberalism Without
Perfection (Oxford: OUP), ch.8 (“Truth and Scepticism”).
·
J. Raz (1990), “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 19,
pp.3–46 (esp.3-15).
·
T. Scanlon (2003), “Rawls on Justification,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (CUP), pp. 139-167.
7. The
Political Liberties and their ‘Fair Value’ (March 16th)
Required readings:
o John Rawls
(2005) “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,” in Rawls, Political Liberalism, Exp. Ed. (Columbia Univ. Press), pp.289-371—esp.
§§6-7 (pp.315-31).
o Steven Wall (2006) “Rawls
and the Status of Political Liberty,” Pacific
Phil. Quarterly 87, pp.245-270.
o
Meena Krishnamurthy (2013) “Completing Rawls’s
arguments for equal political liberty and its fair value: the argument from
self-respect,” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 43, pp.179-205.
Recommended reading:
o J. Rawls (1995) “Reply to Habermas,” §§3-4
(pp.396-421 in PL).
o Meena
Krishnamurthy (2012) “Reconceiving Rawls’s Arguments for Equal Political
Liberty and its Fair Value: on Our Higher-Order Interests,” Social Theory and Practice 38, pp.258-78.
Optional readings:
o C. Brettschneider (2006) “The Value
Theory of Democracy,” Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 5: 259-278.
o H. Brighouse (1997) “Political Equality
in Justice as Fairness,” Philosophical
Studies 86, pp. 155-184.
o J. Cohen (2003) “For a Democratic
Society,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Rawls, ed. S. Freeman (Cambridge University Press), pp. 86-138.
o N. Daniels (1989[1975]) “Equal Liberty
and Unequal Worth of Liberty,” Reading
Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels (Blackwell), pp. 253-81.
o A. Gutmann (2003) “Rawls on the Relationship
between Liberalism and Democracy,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. S. Freeman (CUP), pp.168-199.
o H.L.A. Hart (1973) “Rawls on Liberty
and its Priority,” The University of
Chicago Law Review 40, pp.534-55.
o B. Neufeld (2017) “Freedom, Money, and
Justice as Fairness,” Politics,
Philosophy & Economics (forthcoming).
o R. Taylor (2003) “Rawls’s Defense of
the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31: 246-271.
8. The
Convergence Account of Public Justification (March 30th)
Required
Readings:
o G. Gaus and K. Vallier (2009) “The
Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications
of Convergence, Asymmetry, and Political Institutions,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, pp.51-76.
o G. Gaus (2010)
“Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State: Justificatory Liberalism’s
Classical Tilt,” Social Philosophy &
Policy 27, pp.233-75.
Optional Reading:
o
G. Gaus (2011), The Order of
Public Reason (Cambridge University Press), especially:
§ Ch.1, pp.1-51,
Conclusion to Ch.2, p.100, Conclusion to Ch.3, p.181, Sec. 10, pp.163-182, Sec.
13, pp. 232-258, Ch.5, pp.261-287, 293-305, 310-333, Ch.6, pp.334-388, Ch.7, pp.390-392,
400-403, 410, 413-417, 425-447, Ch.8, pp. 448-550.
o
K. Vallier (2014) Liberal Politics
and Public Faith (Routledge).
9. Convergence
Public Justification, Coercion, & Classical Liberalism (April 6th)
Required Readings:
o G.A. Cohen (2011) “Freedom and Money”
in G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of
Egalitarian Justice (Princeton University Press), pp.166-99.
o A. Lister (2012) “The
Classical Tilt of Justificatory Liberalism,” European Journal of Political Theory 12, pp.316-326.
o J. Boettcher (2014)
“Against the Asymmetric Convergence Model of Public Justification,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
(online early version: DOI 10.1007/s10677-014-9519-7).
o K. Vallier (2016) “In
Defense of the Asymmetric Convergence Model of Public Justification,” Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 19, pp.255-266.
Optional Readings:
o A. Lister (2010) “Public Justification
and the Limits of State Action,” Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 9, pp.151-175.
o M. Lister (2011) “Review of The Order of Public Reason,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews [http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24757-the-order-of-public-reason-a-theory-of-freedom-and-morality-in-a-diverse-and-bounded-world/],
esp. the final 7 paragraphs (from “In the final section of the book…” onwards).
o G. Gaus (2010) “On Two Critics of
Justificatory Liberalism: A Response to Wall and Lister,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 9, pp.177-212.
10. Public
Reason, Assurance, and Stability: The Consensus View (April 20th)
Required Readings:
o P. Weithman (2015) “Inclusivism,
Stability, Assurance,” in T. Bailey and V. Gentile (eds.) Rawls and Religion (Columbia University Press), pp.75-96.
o G. Hadfield and S. Macedo (2012)
“Rational Reasonableness,” Law and Ethics
of Human Rights 6, pp.7-46.
o A. Lister (2017) “Public Reason and
Reciprocity,” Journal of Political
Philosophy (forthcoming).
Optional Readings:
o
J. Rawls (2001) Justice as
Fairness: A Restatement, Part V (pp.180-202).
o
P. Weithman (2011) Why Political
Liberalism?, ‘Introduction’ (pp. 3-16), Ch. IX (270-300), Ch. X (301-343)
11. Public
Reason, Assurance, and Stability: The Convergence View (April 27th)
Required Readings:
o G. Gaus (2011) “A Tale of Two Sets:
Public Reason in Equilibrium,” Public
Affairs Quarterly 25, pp.305-325.
o J. Thrasher and K. Vallier (2014) “The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason,
Diversity and Stability,” The European
Journal of Philosophy 21.
12. Realizing
Citizens’ Political Autonomy: Convergence vs. Consensus (May 4th)
Required Readings:
o K. Vallier (2016) “Public Justification
vs. Public Deliberation: The Case for Divorce,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45, pp.139-158.
o P. Weithman (2011) “Convergence and
Political Autonomy,” Public Affairs
Quarterly 25, pp.327-348.
o B. Neufeld (2017) “Rousseauian Public
Reasoning” (draft paper).
Optional reading:
o J. Rawls (1995) “Reply to Habermas,”
§§3-4 (pp.396-421 in PL).
13. Public
Reason Liberalism and Citizenship Education (May 11th)
Required Readings:
o A. Gutmann (1995) “Civic Education and
Social Diversity,” Ethics 105,
pp.64-88.
o G. Davis and B. Neufeld (2007)
“Political Liberalism, Civic Education, and Educational Choice,” Social Theory and Practice 43, pp.47-74.
o K. Vallier (2014) Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (Routledge),
ch.7 (“Reconciliation in Policy—Public Education”), pp.225-254.
Recommended Reading:
o B. Neufeld (2013) “Political Liberalism
and Citizenship Education,” Philosophy
Compass 8/9, pp.781-797.
Optional Readings:
o
E. Callan (1996) “Political Liberalism and Political Education,”’ Review of Politics 58, pp.5-33.
o
E. Callan (1997) Creating
Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy (Oxford: OUP).
o
V.
M. Costa (2011) Rawls, Citizenship, and
Education (New York: Routledge).
o
K.
Ebels-Duggan (2013) “Moral Education in the Liberal State,” Journal of Practical Ethics 1, pp.24-63.
o
E.
Edenberg (2016) “Civic Education: Political or Comprehensive?” in J. Drerup, et
al. (eds.) Justice, Education and the
Politics of Childhood (Springer), pp.187-206.
o
C. Fernández and M. Sundström (2011) “Citizenship Education and
Liberalism: A State of the Debate Analysis 1990-2010,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 30, pp.363-84.
o
S.
Macedo (2000) Diversity and Distrust:
Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Harvard University Press).
o
B.
Neufeld and G. Davis (2010) “Civic Respect, Civic Education, and the Family,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 42,
pp.94-111.
Additional Topics:
(These topics could not be covered in class
due to time. However, students may write papers on them if they wish.)
14. Sincerity and Convergence Public
Justification
Required
readings:
o M.
Schwartzman (2011) “The Sincerity of Public Reason,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 19, pp.375-398.
o J.
Quong (2011) Liberalism Without
Perfection (Oxford University Press), ch. 9 (“The Scope and Structure of
Public Reason”), pp.256-289.
o K.
Vallier (2014) Liberal Politics and
Public Faith (Routledge), ch.4 (“Convergence—One Problem, Many Solutions”),
pp.103-144.
Optional
reading:
o E.
Markovits (2006) “The Trouble with Being Earnest: Deliberative Democracy and
the Sincerity Norm,” Journal of Political
Philosophy 14, pp.249-269.
15. Debating
Convergence Public Justification
Required Readings:
o D. Enoch (2013) “The Disorder of Public
Reason,” Ethics 124, pp.141-76.
o G. Gaus (2015) “On Dissing Public
Reason: A Reply to Enoch,” Ethics
125, pp.1078-95.
