Below is the description of and schedule for my seminar on “Political Egalitarianism” (spring 2021). The seminar includes both graduate (MA) students and advanced undergraduate students.
If you have any suggestions for additional optional readings please let me know (I’m assembling a list of such readings for the graduate students and my own future reference).
Course Overview
Conceptions of justice that are “liberal” in nature are committed to securing for all citizens a set of individual basic liberties (freedom of association, liberty of conscience, the right to vote, and so forth) within society’s constitutional structure. Conceptions of liberal justice that are “egalitarian” in nature also are committed to securing for all citizens adequate resources (education, wealth, etc.) for them to exercise their basic liberties over the course of their lives. Hence “liberal egalitarian” conceptions of justice aim to realize the ideals of liberty and equality for all citizens.
Two families of liberal egalitarian conceptions of justice have emerged over the past few decades: “luck egalitarianism” and “relational egalitarianism.” Both families share a common ancestor: the account of justice presented in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971). Luck egalitarians have understood their project, at least in part, as developing the implications of Rawls’s comments on the “moral arbitrariness” of the distribution of unchosen social and natural advantages into a distinct approach to theorizing about justice, one that is egalitarian in nature but also sensitive to individual responsibility. According to luck egalitarians, roughly, the aim of justice is to neutralize any disadvantages that people are born into or acquire as the result of brute luck, disadvantages for which they are not responsible and consequently do not deserve (e.g., being struck by lightning or being born into poverty). In a fully just luck egalitarian society, people would fare well or poorly solely in conformity to those decisions and actions for which they are responsible.
Despite helping to inspire luck egalitarianism, though, Rawls’s conception of “justice as fairness” is a relational egalitarian conception. Relational egalitarians generally follow Rawls’s contractualist approach to thinking about justice. According to this approach, principles of political justice should be understood as rationally constructed in order to satisfy the requirements of reciprocity among free and equal citizens under conditions of relative scarcity. A fully just relational egalitarian society is not one that “neutralizes luck,” but rather one in which citizens relate to each other as social equals on the basis of mutual respect, and freely govern their lives on conditions fair to all.
In this seminar we will read Rawls’s final presentation of his conception of justice, as presented in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). The institutional implications of justice as fairness then will be considered: does justice require a form of “liberal socialism,” “property-owning democracy,” “welfare-state capitalism,” or “free market liberalism”? We then will consider the account of luck egalitarianism advanced by G.A. Cohen. We will look at the relation between luck egalitarianism and the form of democratic socialism that Cohen defends in Why Not Socialism? (2008). Finally, we will examine the criticisms of luck egalitarianism advanced by Elizabeth Anderson and others, along with some luck egalitarian replies.
Schedule
01. Justice as fairness: overview (February 2nd + 4th)
o John Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness (Harvard University Press), Part I (pp. 1-38).
§ Optional:
· L. Wenar (2017) “John Rawls,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, §§1-4. [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/]
02. Justice as fairness: the principles of justice and the original position (February 9th + 11th)
o J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness (Harvard UP), Parts II and III (pp. 39-134).
§ Optional:
· J. Mandle (2014) “The Choice from the Original Position,” in A Companion to Rawls, ed. J. Mandle (Wiley Blackwell), pp. 128-143.
03. Justice as fairness: property-owning democracy and stability (February 16th +18th)
o J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness (Harvard UP), Parts IV and V (pp. 135-202).
o S. Freeman (2013) “Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference Principle,” Analyse & Kritik, 35 (1), pp. 9-36. [Reprinted in: S. Freeman (2018) Liberalism and Distributive Justice, chapter 4.]
§ Optional:
· R. Krouse & M. McPherson (1988) “Capitalism, ‘Property-Owning Democracy,’ and the Welfare State,” in Democracy and the Welfare State, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton University Press), pp. 79-105.
· Colin Macleod (2014) “Applying Justice as Fairness to Institutions,” in J. Mandle & D. Reidy (eds.) A Companion to Rawls (Wiley Blackwell): 164-84.
· N. Daniels (2003) “Democratic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism”, in S. Freeman (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 241-276.
04. Is social justice a ‘mirage’? Hayek against/for Rawls (February 23rd + 25th)
o F. A. Hayek (1993) “‘Social’ or Distributive Justice,” in Justice, ed. A. Ryan (Oxford University Press), pp. 117-158. [From: F. A. Hayek (1982) Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. II: The Mirage of Social Justice.]
o Andrew Lister (2013) “The ‘Mirage’ of Social Justice: Hayek Against (And For) Rawls,” Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 25: 3-4, pp. 409-444.
05. Rawlsian liberal socialism – part I (March 2nd + 4th)
o William Edmundson (2020) “What Is the Argument for the Fair Value of Political Liberty?” Social Theory and Practice 46 (3), pp. 497-514.
o W. Edmundson (2017) John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): Introduction and Chapters 1-3 (pp.1-64).
06. Rawlsian liberal socialism – part II (March 9th + 11th)
o W. Edmundson (2017) John Rawls: Reticent Socialist: Chapters 4-9 (pp. 65-138).
07. Rawlsian liberal socialism – part III (March 16th + 18th)
o W. Edmundson (2017) John Rawls: Reticent Socialist: Chapters 10 and 12 (pp. 139-169; 186-199).
o Paul Weithman (2019) “Review of W. Edmundson, John Rawls: Reticent Socialist,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews [https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/john-rawls-reticent-socialist/#_edn16]
o Lea Ypi (2018) “The Politics of Reticent Socialism,” Catalyst 2 (3). [https://catalyst-journal.com/vol2/no3/the-politics-of-reticent-socialism]
§ Optional:
· W. Edmundson (2017) John Rawls: Reticent Socialist: Chapter 11 (pp. 170-185).
08. Rawlsian free market liberalism (March 30th + April 1st)
o J. Tomasi (2012) “Democratic Legitimacy and Economic Liberty,” Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1), pp. 50-80.
o C. M. Melenovsky and Justin Bernstein (2015) “Why Free Market Rights are not Basic Liberties,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2), pp. 47-67.
o A. Thomas (2020) “Rawls on Economic Liberty and the Choice of Systems of Social Cooperation,” in J. Mandle and S. Roberts-Cady (eds.) John Rawls: Debating the Major Questions (Oxford University Press), pp.109-121.
§ Optional:
· J. Rawls (2005) “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,” in Political Liberalism, expanded edition (Columbia University Press), pp.289-371.
· S. Arnold (2013) “Right-wing Rawlsianism: A Critique,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (4), pp. 382-404.
· J. Tomasi (2012) Free Market Fairness (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
April 2nd: Philosophy Department talk by William Edmundson: “When the Market Swerved Right.”
09. Capitalism and alternatives to it (once more) (April 6th + 8th)
o Jeppe von Platz (2020) “Democratic Equality and the Justification of Welfare-State Capitalism,” Ethics 131 (1), pp. 4-33.
o Martin O’Neill (2021) “Social Justice and Economic Systems: On Rawls, Democratic Socialism, and Alternatives to Capitalism,” Philosophical Topics 49 (1).
§ Optional:
· Julius Sensat (2016) The Logic of Estrangement (Palgrave MacMillan), Chapter 7 (pp. 157-187).
· T. Malleson (2014), “Rawls, Property-Owning Democracy, and Democratic Socialism,” Journal of Social Philosophy 45, pp. 228-251.
· R. Taylor (2014) “Illiberal Socialism,” Social Theory and Practice, July 2014, 40(3), pp. 433-60.
· K. Vallier (2015), “A moral and economic critique of the new property-owning democrats: on behalf of a Rawlsian welfare state,” Philosophical Studies 172, pp. 283-304.
10. Cohenite socialism (April 13th + 15th)
o G. A. Cohen (2009) Why Not Socialism? (Princeton University Press).
11. Debating Cohenite socialism (April 20th + 22nd)
o C. V. Schoelandt (2013) “Markets, Community, and Pluralism,” The Philosophical Quarterly (advance access), pp. 1-8.
o A. Archer (2016) “Community, Pluralism, and Individualistic Pursuits: A Defense of Why Not Socialism?” Social Theory and Practice 42 (1), pp. 57-73.
§ Optional:
· Pablo Gilabert (2011) “Feasibility and Socialism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 19, pp. 52-63.
· R. Miller (2010) “Relationships of Equality: A Camping Trip Revisited,” Journal of Ethics 14.
· Miriam Ronzoni (2012) “Life is not a camping
trip – on the desirability of Cohenite socialism,” Politics, Philosophy
& Economics 11/2, pp. 171-185.
12. Luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism (April 27th + 29th)
o G. A. Cohen (1989) “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics 99 (4), pp. 906-944.
o Elizabeth Anderson (1999) “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109 (2), pp. 287-337.
§ Optional:
· J. Wolff (1998) “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 27, pp.97-122.
· S. Scheffler (2003) “What Is Egalitarianism?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, pp. 5-39.
· M. O’Neill (2008) “What Should Egalitarians Believe?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, pp. 119-156.
· D. Miller (2015) “The Incoherence of Luck Egalitarianism,” in A. Kaufman (ed.) Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage: G. A. Cohen’s Egalitarianism (Cambridge University Press), pp. 131-150.
· S. Freeman (2007) “Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism,” in S. Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract (Oxford University Press), pp. 111-142.
13. Luck egalitarian replies to the relational egalitarianism (May 4th + 6th)
o Anca Gheaus (2016) “Hikers in Flip-Flops: Luck Egalitarianism, Democratic Equality, and the Distribuenda of Justice,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (1), pp. 54-69.
o P. Tomlin (2015) “What is the Point of Egalitarian Social Relationships?” in A. Kaufman (ed.) Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage: G. A. Cohen’s Egalitarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 151-179.
§ Optional:
· Shlomi Segall (2007) “In Solidarity with the Imprudent: A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism,” Social Theory and Practice 33 (2), pp. 177–198.
14. Relational egalitarianism once more (May 11th + 13th)
o Elizabeth Anderson (2010) “The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, S.V. 36, pp.1-23.
o Ian Carter (2011) “Respect and the Basis of Equality,” Ethics 121 (3), 538-571.
§ Optional:
· C. Schemmel (2011) “Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions,” Social Theory and Practice 37 (3), pp. 365-390.
