Schedule for Political Egalitarianism seminar (spring 2021)

 

Below is the description of and schedule for my seminar on “Political Egalitarianism” (spring 2021). The seminar includes both graduate (MA) students and advanced undergraduate students. 

 

If you have any suggestions for additional optional readings please let me know (I’m assembling a list of such readings for the graduate students and my own future reference).

Course Overview

 

Conceptions of justice that are “liberal” in nature are committed to securing for all citizens a set of individual basic liberties (freedom of association, liberty of conscience, the right to vote, and so forth) within society’s constitutional structure. Conceptions of liberal justice that are “egalitarian” in nature also are committed to securing for all citizens adequate resources (education, wealth, etc.) for them to exercise their basic liberties over the course of their lives. Hence “liberal egalitarian” conceptions of justice aim to realize the ideals of liberty and equality for all citizens.

 

Two families of liberal egalitarian conceptions of justice have emerged over the past few decades: “luck egalitarianism” and “relational egalitarianism.” Both families share a common ancestor: the account of justice presented in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971). Luck egalitarians have understood their project, at least in part, as developing the implications of Rawls’s comments on the “moral arbitrariness” of the distribution of unchosen social and natural advantages into a distinct approach to theorizing about justice, one that is egalitarian in nature but also sensitive to individual responsibility. According to luck egalitarians, roughly, the aim of justice is to neutralize any disadvantages that people are born into or acquire as the result of brute luck, disadvantages for which they are not responsible and consequently do not deserve (e.g., being struck by lightning or being born into poverty). In a fully just luck egalitarian society, people would fare well or poorly solely in conformity to those decisions and actions for which they are responsible.

 

Despite helping to inspire luck egalitarianism, though, Rawls’s conception of “justice as fairness” is a relational egalitarian conception. Relational egalitarians generally follow Rawls’s contractualist approach to thinking about justice. According to this approach, principles of political justice should be understood as rationally constructed in order to satisfy the requirements of reciprocity among free and equal citizens under conditions of relative scarcity. A fully just relational egalitarian society is not one that “neutralizes luck,” but rather one in which citizens relate to each other as social equals on the basis of mutual respect, and freely govern their lives on conditions fair to all.

 

In this seminar we will read Rawls’s final presentation of his conception of justice, as presented in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). The institutional implications of justice as fairness then will be considered: does justice require a form of “liberal socialism,” “property-owning democracy,” “welfare-state capitalism,” or “free market liberalism”? We then will consider the account of luck egalitarianism advanced by G.A. Cohen. We will look at the relation between luck egalitarianism and the form of democratic socialism that Cohen defends in Why Not Socialism? (2008). Finally, we will examine the criticisms of luck egalitarianism advanced by Elizabeth Anderson and others, along with some luck egalitarian replies.

Schedule

01. Justice as fairness: overview (February 2^nd + 4^th)  

 

o       John Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness (Harvard University Press), Part I (pp. 1-38).

 

§  Optional:  

·       L. Wenar (2017) “John Rawls,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, §§1-4. [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/]

 

02. Justice as fairness: the principles of justice and the original position (February 9^th + 11^th)

 

o       J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness (Harvard UP), Parts II and III (pp. 39-134).

 

§  Optional:

·       J. Mandle (2014) “The Choice from the Original Position,” in A Companion to Rawls, ed. J. Mandle (Wiley Blackwell), pp. 128-143.

 

03. Justice as fairness: property-owning democracy and stability (February 16^th +18^th)

 

o       J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness (Harvard UP), Parts IV and V (pp. 135-202). 

o       S. Freeman (2013) “Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference Principle,” Analyse & Kritik, 35 (1), pp. 9-36. [Reprinted in: S. Freeman (2018) Liberalism and Distributive Justice, chapter 4.]

 

§  Optional:

·       R. Krouse & M. McPherson (1988) “Capitalism, ‘Property-Owning Democracy,’ and the Welfare State,” in Democracy and the Welfare State, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton University Press), pp. 79-105. 

·       Colin Macleod (2014) “Applying Justice as Fairness to Institutions,” in J. Mandle & D. Reidy (eds.) A Companion to Rawls (Wiley Blackwell): 164-84.

·       N. Daniels (2003) “Democratic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism”, in S. Freeman (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 241-276.

04. Is social justice a ‘mirage’? Hayek against/for Rawls (February 23^rd + 25^th)

 

o       F. A. Hayek (1993) “‘Social’ or Distributive Justice,” in Justice, ed. A. Ryan (Oxford University Press), pp. 117-158. [From: F. A. Hayek (1982) Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. II: The Mirage of Social Justice.] 

o       Andrew Lister (2013) “The ‘Mirage’ of Social Justice: Hayek Against (And For) Rawls,” Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 25: 3-4, pp. 409-444.

 

05. Rawlsian liberal socialism – part I (March 2^nd + 4^th)

 

o       William Edmundson (2020) “What Is the Argument for the Fair Value of Political Liberty?” Social Theory and Practice 46 (3), pp. 497-514.

o       W. Edmundson (2017) John Rawls: Reticent Socialist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press):  Introduction and Chapters 1-3 (pp.1-64).

 

06. Rawlsian liberal socialism – part II (March 9^th + 11^th)

 

o       W. Edmundson (2017) John Rawls: Reticent Socialist: Chapters 4-9 (pp. 65-138).

 

07. Rawlsian liberal socialism – part III (March 16^th + 18^th)

 

o       W. Edmundson (2017) John Rawls: Reticent Socialist: Chapters 10 and 12 (pp. 139-169; 186-199). 

o       Paul Weithman (2019) “Review of W. Edmundson, John Rawls: Reticent Socialist,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews [https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/john-rawls-reticent-socialist/#_edn16]

o       Lea Ypi (2018) “The Politics of Reticent Socialism,” Catalyst 2 (3). [https://catalyst-journal.com/vol2/no3/the-politics-of-reticent-socialism]

 

§  Optional:

·       W. Edmundson (2017) John Rawls: Reticent Socialist: Chapter 11 (pp. 170-185).

 

08. Rawlsian free market liberalism (March 30^th + April 1^st)

 

o       J. Tomasi (2012) “Democratic Legitimacy and Economic Liberty,” Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1), pp. 50-80. 

o       C. M. Melenovsky and Justin Bernstein (2015) “Why Free Market Rights are not Basic Liberties,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2), pp. 47-67.

o       A. Thomas (2020) “Rawls on Economic Liberty and the Choice of Systems of Social Cooperation,” in J. Mandle and S. Roberts-Cady (eds.) John Rawls: Debating the Major Questions (Oxford University Press), pp.109-121.

 

§  Optional: 

·       J. Rawls (2005) “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,” in Political Liberalism, expanded edition (Columbia University Press), pp.289-371.

·       S. Arnold (2013) “Right-wing Rawlsianism: A Critique,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (4), pp. 382-404. 

·       J. Tomasi (2012) Free Market Fairness (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

 

April 2^nd: Philosophy Department talk by William Edmundson: “When the Market Swerved Right.”

 

09. Capitalism and alternatives to it (once more) (April 6^th + 8^th)

 

o       Jeppe von Platz (2020) “Democratic Equality and the Justification of Welfare-State Capitalism,” Ethics 131 (1), pp. 4-33.

o       Martin O’Neill (2021) “Social Justice and Economic Systems: On Rawls, Democratic Socialism, and Alternatives to Capitalism,” Philosophical Topics 49 (1).

 

§  Optional:

·       Julius Sensat (2016) The Logic of Estrangement (Palgrave MacMillan), Chapter 7 (pp. 157-187).

·       T. Malleson (2014), “Rawls, Property-Owning Democracy, and Democratic Socialism,” Journal of Social Philosophy 45, pp. 228-251. 

·       R. Taylor (2014) “Illiberal Socialism,” Social Theory and Practice, July 2014, 40(3), pp. 433-60. 

·       K. Vallier (2015), “A moral and economic critique of the new property-owning democrats: on behalf of a Rawlsian welfare state,” Philosophical Studies 172, pp. 283-304.

 

10. Cohenite socialism (April 13^th + 15^th)

 

o       G. A. Cohen (2009) Why Not Socialism? (Princeton University Press).

 

11. Debating Cohenite socialism (April 20^th + 22^nd)

 

o       C. V. Schoelandt (2013) “Markets, Community, and Pluralism,” The Philosophical Quarterly (advance access), pp. 1-8.  

o       A. Archer (2016) “Community, Pluralism, and Individualistic Pursuits: A Defense of Why Not Socialism?” Social Theory and Practice 42 (1), pp. 57-73.

 

§  Optional:

·       Pablo Gilabert (2011) “Feasibility and Socialism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 19, pp. 52-63. 

·       R. Miller (2010) “Relationships of Equality: A Camping Trip Revisited,” Journal of Ethics 14.

·       Miriam Ronzoni (2012) “Life is not a camping trip – on the desirability of Cohenite socialism,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11/2, pp. 171-185.

 

12. Luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism (April 27^th + 29^th)

 

o       G. A. Cohen (1989) “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics 99 (4), pp. 906-944.

o       Elizabeth Anderson (1999) “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109 (2), pp. 287-337.

 

§  Optional: 

·       J. Wolff (1998) “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 27, pp.97-122.

·       S. Scheffler (2003) “What Is Egalitarianism?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, pp. 5-39. 

·       M. O’Neill (2008) “What Should Egalitarians Believe?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, pp. 119-156.

·       D. Miller (2015) “The Incoherence of Luck Egalitarianism,” in A. Kaufman (ed.) Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage: G. A. Cohen’s Egalitarianism (Cambridge University Press), pp. 131-150. 

·       S. Freeman (2007) “Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism,” in S. Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract (Oxford University Press), pp. 111-142.

 

13. Luck egalitarian replies to the relational egalitarianism (May 4^th + 6^th)

 

o       Anca Gheaus (2016) “Hikers in Flip-Flops: Luck Egalitarianism, Democratic Equality, and the Distribuenda of Justice,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (1), pp. 54-69.

o       P. Tomlin (2015) “What is the Point of Egalitarian Social Relationships?” in A. Kaufman (ed.) Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage: G. A. Cohen’s Egalitarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 151-179.

 

§  Optional: 

·       Shlomi Segall (2007) “In Solidarity with the Imprudent: A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism,” Social Theory and Practice 33 (2), pp. 177–198.

 

14. Relational egalitarianism once more (May 11^th + 13^th)

 

o       Elizabeth Anderson (2010) “The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, S.V. 36, pp.1-23.

o       Ian Carter (2011) “Respect and the Basis of Equality,” Ethics 121 (3), 538-571.

 

§  Optional: 

·       C. Schemmel (2011) “Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions,” Social Theory and Practice 37 (3), pp. 365-390. 

 

[G.A. Cohen]

Existential Comics and Misinterpreting Rawls

I'm a fan of Existential Comics but today's post was quite inaccurate in its presentation of John Rawls's views. Roughly, it relies on the misinterpretation—thankfully less common today than it was 2+ decades ago—that Rawls's theory defends an egalitarian version of welfare-state capitalism.

So, I wrote to the author explaining my concerns with the comic. Here is the main content of that message:

“I normally very much enjoy your comics. Indeed, I look forward to reading them every week. But I found today’s comic on John Rawls to be astonishingly unfair.

Rawls explicitly states in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement that welfare-state capitalism is incompatible with the principles of justice as fairness. Only 'liberal socialism' or 'property-owning democracy' can satisfy those principles. Both LS and POD are radically more egalitarian social systems than existing welfare-state capitalist societies. This is explained clearly in Part IV of Justice as Fairness.

Rawls’s anti-capitalism is in A Theory of Justice as well, but many readers of it – including, unfortunately, Robert Paul Wolff – misinterpreted that work as somehow defending a more egalitarian form of welfare-state capitalism. In his later work Rawls took pains to try to address this misinterpretation (including in the Preface to the revised edition of Theory).

For an excellent recent book on Rawls’s political philosophy, which defends a socialist reading of it, I recommend John Rawls: Reticent Socialist by William Edmundson.

Anyhow, I’m sure that you no doubt have received messages from defenders of other philosophers in the past upset over your portrayal of them in your comics. And nobody, of course, should assume that a comic must be fully fair or accurate with respect to the thinkers it portrays. But as a leftist and a ‘Rawlsian’, I wanted at least to register my dismay at the portrayal of Rawls’s views in today’s comic.”

The author kindly wrote back and added a paragraph at the bottom of the comic’s webpage (the one that starts with "It should be noted..."). That paragraph doesn't exactly address the matter I raised, but I was grateful for the consideration nonetheless.

I followed up with a further reply, but since some of it is specific to the author’s reply to my original message, I will only post the following excerpt:

“As for Rawls’s position on socialism, it is most clearly stated in Part IV of Justice as Fairness (2001). He explicitly rejects welfare state capitalism there. It’s as clear as can be (“Welfare-state capitalism … rejects the fair value of the political liberties … It permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property (productive assets and natural resources) so that the control of the economy and much of political life rests in few hands. … And … a principle of reciprocity to regulate economic and social inequalities is not recognized.” [pp. 137-138]). He claims that either ‘liberal socialism’ or ‘property-owning democracy’ are compatible with his principles (the latter distributes productive property [capital] to all citizens, the former insists on shared ownership of productive capital). You’re right that both LS and POD continue to use ‘markets’ but I think that markets are not the same thing as ‘capitalism’ (markets existed long before the rise of capitalism, and possibly may exist after the end of capitalism).

You’re right that Rawls himself never clearly sided with either property-owning democracy or liberal socialism – he seems to have wanted to remain agnostic on that question (despite condemning laissez-faire capitalism, welfare-state capitalism, and state socialism). Edmundson’s book argues that Rawls, given his conception of justice, should have endorsed democratic liberal socialism (hence the “Reticent” in the title).”

So that’s that. My work for the day is done.

Of course, I remain a fan of Existential Comics, and very much look forward to reading it next week!

Piketty and Rawls on capitalism and inequality

I read Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century last year.  In fact, I was involved in two reading groups on the book, an online group organized by my friend Christopher Robichaud at the Kennedy School of Government (summer 2014), and one ‘in person’ group at the University of Toronto Law School (autumn 2014).  It was the longest book that I’d read, I think, since Jonathan Strange and Mr. Norrell, but well worth it.

In the book Piketty documents the long-term tendency of capitalist societies toward what he terms ‘patrimonial capitalism.’  A patrimonial capitalist society, roughly, is one in which the members of that society’s economic elite enjoy their privileged position primarily as a consequence of inheritance, not innovation or entrepreneurship.  Simplifying greatly, the reason for this tendency is that returns to capital (‘r’) generally grow at a higher rate than the overall economy (‘g’).  Consequently, the already wealthy within society tend to become wealthier at a much faster rate than anyone else, and, moreover, pass this advantage on to their descendants.  This economic elite becomes largely a class of rentiers.  The members of this class also are able to employ their wealth to influence the political decision-making processes of their society, thereby undermining the democratic equality of citizens. 

One thing that really struck my about Piketty’s book is how much it supports Rawls’s earlier, more speculative worries about the long-term tendency of capitalist societies toward growing inequality, decreasing political freedom for most citizens, and hence injustice.  Rawls’s preferred regime types – which are ‘realistic utopias’ that are to be created out of our existing societies (they are regime types that have never been realized) – are ‘property-owning democracy’ and ‘liberal socialism.’  Both of these kinds of societies counteract capitalism’s tendency toward ever-increasing inequality and plutocracy, despite being (to a great extent) market societies.  One way that these societies do this is by limiting the total amount of wealth that citizens can inherit.  This counter-acts the intergenerational concentration of wealth within a small portion of the population, and sustains the democratic equality of all citizens over time.

Anyhow, what motivated me to post something on Piketty now is that the blog Crooked Timber is wrapping up an online ‘seminar’ on Capital in the 21st Century.  I’ve only read Elizabeth Anderson’s piece so far, but the contributors are all impressive thinkers, so I look forward to checking out the other posts in the near future, as well as Piketty’s forthcoming response.