Political Liberalism, Autonomy, and Education

I’ve written yet another piece on political liberalism and education. This one focuses on autonomy: “Political Liberalism, Autonomy, and Education.” It will be coming out (in 2020) in The Palgrave Handbook of Citizenship and Education, edited by A. Peterson, G. Stahl, and H. Soong.

Here is the abstract:

Citizens are politically autonomous insofar as they are subject to laws that are (a) justified by reasons acceptable to them and (b) authorized by them via their political institutions. An obstacle to the equal realization of political autonomy is the plurality of religious, moral, and philosophical views endorsed by citizens. Decisions regarding certain fundamental political issues (e.g., abortion) can involve citizens imposing political positions justified in terms of their respective worldviews upon others. Despite citizens’ disagreements over which worldview is correct, ‘political liberalism’ claims that there is a form of political autonomy that is realizable within pluralist societies. (Political liberalism differs from ‘comprehensive liberalism’ by, inter alia, being ‘freestanding’ vis-à-vis citizens’ different worldviews.) Citizens can be politically autonomous if they enjoy equal political power and justify its exercise with ‘public reasons.’ A political liberal education would aim at ensuring that all students can become politically autonomous citizens by teaching them how to exercise their democratic rights effectively and how to engage in public reasoning. Some political and educational theorists, however, argue that teaching students how to be politically autonomous amounts to teaching them how to be ‘comprehensively’ autonomous. If this is so, then the distinction between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism collapses, at least with respect to education. This chapter outlines the main elements of political liberalism, summarizes the main requirements of a political liberal citizenship education, and surveys three arguments in support of and against the thesis that a political liberal education amounts to an education for comprehensive autonomy.

A pre-print version (identical in terms of content) is available here.

This essay is a (kind of) ‘companion’ to my 2013 Philosophy Compass article, “Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education.” It has a somewhat different focus (autonomy, obviously), but the two pieces together should provide (I think) a pretty decent overview of the main debates on political liberalism and education over the past 25 years. And of course the more recent article covers some more recent work on the topic.

Libertarianism in action: violence in Chile

From the blog Lawyers, Guns, and Money:

“It’s well known how right-wing economists have long seen Chile as their personal playground to play out their fantasies of austerity politics backed by authoritarian violence. The Chicago Boys were the famed University of Chicago-trained economists who advised Augusto Pinochet during and after the 1973 coup.
[…]
The center of that shifted from Chicago to George Mason, which has become synonymous with bought academia of the New Gilded Age, funded by the Koch Brothers and other far-right extremists.”
[…]
When the histories of the New Gilded Age are written, the horrific impact of right-libertarians taking over various parts of George Mason is going to be a major part of those books.”

This is all spot on, of course. But what prompted this particular post at LGM was this incident involving an American libertarian, John Corbin, now living and championing 'neo-liberalism' in Chile. As the Washington Post explains:

“John Cobin, a U.S.-born economist and former member of a neo-Confederate group, is so passionate about a free market — and about Chile — that he has devoted the past two decades to marrying the two.
But Cobin’s unusual story took a violent turn this weekend, when he drove through one of the many crowds that have paralyzed Chile in recent weeks as they protest income inequality and a high cost of living.
The 56-year-old was arrested Sunday, police said, after he repeatedly fired a gun into a crowd in the beachside town of Reñaca, seriously injuring at least one person.
[…]
The shocking incident underscores the violence that Chilean protesters have been facing at the hands of their government, and occasionally other civilians. As of Friday, at least 20 people have been killed and about 1,600 have been injured, according to human rights observers, as crowds face water cannons and tear gas and pellets are shot in close range.
The protests erupted in mid-October, when student-led strikes against a metro fare increase quickly widened into massive anti-government demonstrations that blocked off streets and set subway stations aflame. Even as the Chilean government reshuffled its cabinet and increased taxes on the wealthy, crowds have continued to rail against decades of neoliberal economic policies, including the privatization of water, highways and the pension system.
It was those policies that first made Chile such an attractive destination for staunch free-market Americans like Cobin.
[…]
In countless interviews and letters to the editor, he also expressed a particular admiration for the anti-communist policies of Augusto Pinochet, Chile’s disgraced former military dictator.”

This lovely John Cobin fellow is like the Platonic form of a libertarian nutjob (but I repeat myself). It’s as though a caricature of a libertarian economist from a left-wing comic came alive and moved to Chile.

To paraphrase Nietzsche: “‘Libertarianism’ and ‘authoritarianism’—those rhyme, those more than rhyme.”

Elizabeth Anderson wins MacArthur Fellowship

Elizabeth Anderson—well known for her work in political philosophy, including her influential defence of ‘relational egalitarianism’—has been awarded a MacArthur Fellowship:

"University of Michigan philosopher Elizabeth Anderson—whose research focuses on democratic theory and equality in political philosophy—has been deemed an 'exceptionally creative individual' by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Anderson was one of 26 chosen for the prestigious 2019 MacArthur Fellowship—also known as a 'genius grant.'"

Prof. Anderson (‘Liz’) was the Co-Chair of my PhD dissertation committee back in an earlier era of civilization. Her account of relational egalitarianism, with which I broadly agree, significantly influenced my subsequent thinking and work. (I nonetheless have some disagreements with Liz—mainly about 'ideal theory’—but I naturally worry that I'm the one who is wrong on the matter...)

The injustice of Quebec's Bill 21 and the Canadian federal election

In The Washington Post Calgary mayor Naheed Nenshi takes on Bill 21:

In Quebec, a new law prohibits people who wear conspicuous religious attire from holding certain public-sector jobs, including teachers and police officers.
Jagmeet Singh, a lawyer, is running for prime minister as leader of a national party but, because he wears a turban, could not serve as a judge in Quebec. I, as a Muslim man, could hold any job I want, but under this law, a Muslim woman who covers with a headscarf cannot. Muslim men who wear long beards could claim it’s just a nod to hipster-dom, and be free and clear, but Orthodox Jewish men with the same beard or a yarmulke cannot. Montreal’s mayor can hold any role, but the leader of her opposition, who wears a kippa, cannot. They’ve stood together against the law. 

It’s all flagrantly unconstitutional, but the province of Quebec used the “notwithstanding clause,” a constitutional override provision (ironically, like multiculturalism, a gift from the tenure of the first Prime Minster Trudeau) to protect itself from legal challenge. 

[...] 

Even though the federal government could restrict Quebec’s financing or use its legal power to enjoin the provincial legislation, our federal leaders so far haven’t demonstrated the courage to do so. They’re hardly even talking about it. The law is popular in Quebec, and among others in the country, too. In an election year, they must be thinking, why risk losing those votes? 

[...] 

We cannot stand on moral high ground calling out leaders for offensive things they did, years ago, if we’re not also willing to stand up against the racist and discriminatory behavior that’s right in front of our faces in 2019. We cannot choose our values a la carte when they benefit us — we need to be all-in, all the time.

I wish Jagmeet Singh would adopt something like Nenshi's position on Bill 21. The NDP are going to be wiped out in Quebec anyway, so they may as well go out fighting for justice.

Political liberalism and marriage

Lori Watson discusses Alison Toop's recent article in The Journal of Moral Philosophy -- "Is Marriage Incompatible with Political Liberalism?" -- at PEAsoup (the Philosophy, Ethics, and Academia blog).

Toop's article is interesting, and I broadly agree with what Watson has to say (as usual). I thought this comment in particular was spot on:

"[T]he idea of neutral justifications as a requirement of political liberalism is both overblown and widely misunderstood."

Indeed. I've written widely on political liberalism and I don't recall referring to 'liberal neutrality' or 'neutral justification' in any of my work. This is because I don't find the term or idea felicitous, and it's given rise to many misinterpretations of political liberalism over the years.

Equal Citizenship and Public Reason

This excellent book by Lori Watson and Christie Hartley—Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A Feminist Political Liberalism—has been out for several months now. Anyone interested in liberal egalitarianism, feminism, and/or public reason should read it.  

Here is the description from the Oxford University Press website:

This book is a defense of political liberalism as a feminist liberalism. The first half of the book develops and defends a novel interpretation of political liberalism. It is argued that political liberals should accept a restrictive account of public reason and that political liberals' account of public justification is superior to the leading alternative, the convergence account of public justification. The view is defended from the charge that such a restrictive account of public reason will unduly threaten or undermine the integrity of some religiously oriented citizens and an account of when political liberals can recognize exemptions, including religious exemptions, from generally applicable laws is offered. In the second half of the book, it is argued that political liberalism's core commitments restrict all reasonable conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine, substantive equality for women and other marginalized groups. Here it is demonstrated how public reason arguments can be used to support law and policy needed to address historical sites of women's subordination in order to advance equality; prostitution, the gendered division of labor and marriage, in particular, are considered.

I should mention that Christie and Lori are good friends, and I commented on multiple drafts of many of the chapters in the book. Nonetheless, despite my partiality, I am confident that this book will come to be regarded as a key text in the development of political liberalism.

Conservative ‘intellectual’ gets ‘destroyed’

Watching squeaky sophist Ben Shapiro get ‘destroyed’ (doesn’t he normally to the ‘destroying’?) by Andrew Neil on the BBC made my day. (And, hilariously, Shapiro is so clueless that he charges über-Tory Neil with being a ‘Leftist’!)

Here’s a valid argument:

a. If Ben Shapiro represents the intellectual leadership of contemporary American Conservatism,

And

b. If the success of a political movement (e.g., contemporary American Conservatism) depends upon the philosophical cogency of the political views espoused by its intellectual leadership,

Then:

c. Contemporary American Conservatism is doomed.

Of course, while valid, the argument is unsound: premise ‘b’ is manifestly false. American Conservatism (or what is called that today) is thoroughly incoherent, and entirely motivated by a desire to enforce existing hierarchies (racial, gender, class, etc.) and relations of domination.

“Conservatives are not necessarily stupid, but most stupid people are conservatives…” (J.S. Mill)

AOC: Rawlsian?

Could John Rawls's conception of distributive justice -- 'justice as fairness' -- someday actually help shape public policy in the United States?

Perhaps ... if Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal to tax income above 10 million USD at 70 percent is ever realized in law -- or so claims Micah Johnson at Slate.

(Alas, the article gets some things wrong, e.g., that Rawls was a defender of the 'welfare state'; he in fact favoured 'property-owning democracy'. And the 'egalitarian' objection it mentions is accommodated by the 'fair value' of the political liberties guarantee. Still, it's always nice to see justice as fairness mentioned in the popular press!)

Elizabeth Anderson: champion of relational egalitarianism

Looking for a stimulating article with which to start the new year? Try this New Yorker piece on the work and life of Elizabeth Anderson (the John Dewey Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan) by Nathan Heller.

I’ve mentioned Anderson’s important work here before. Her influence on my own research—especially her account of ‘relational equality’—has been enormous. Strangely, though, while Anderson was the Co-Chair of my dissertation committee at the University of Michigan, I have been far more influenced by her work post-PhD than I was while a graduate student. (The reason for this, I think, is that I only felt free to engage critically with her views once I had left the 'student-supervisor' relationship. This was my fault, I should emphasize, as she no doubt would’ve welcomed critical engagement with her work by graduate students.)

I do disagree with Anderson on some points. For instance, I remain critical of what I take to be her uncharitable characterization—and hence unfair criticism—of ‘ideal theory’ (as I explain in my chapter “Why Public Reasoning Involves Ideal Theorizing”.) But whatever disagreements I have with her are, so to speak, ‘minor quibbles’.

I’ve taught her criticisms of ‘luck egalitarianism’ and her arguments in favour of relational egalitarianism in many of my political philosophy courses over the years. And in my ‘political autonomy’ seminar last year I taught her book Private Government (which is mentioned towards the end of the article). Of all the works we discussed—including those by Rousseau and Rawls—this one generated the most intense discussions. No doubt part of the reason for this was that many of the students worked part-time—and hence were regularly subject to the arbitrary power of employers themselves.