Elizabeth Anderson wins MacArthur Fellowship

Elizabeth Anderson—well known for her work in political philosophy, including her influential defence of ‘relational egalitarianism’—has been awarded a MacArthur Fellowship:

"University of Michigan philosopher Elizabeth Anderson—whose research focuses on democratic theory and equality in political philosophy—has been deemed an 'exceptionally creative individual' by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Anderson was one of 26 chosen for the prestigious 2019 MacArthur Fellowship—also known as a 'genius grant.'"

Prof. Anderson (‘Liz’) was the Co-Chair of my PhD dissertation committee back in an earlier era of civilization. Her account of relational egalitarianism, with which I broadly agree, significantly influenced my subsequent thinking and work. (I nonetheless have some disagreements with Liz—mainly about 'ideal theory’—but I naturally worry that I'm the one who is wrong on the matter...)

The Tyranny--or the Democracy--of the Ideal?

Now available online (and for free!): a symposium on Gerald Gaus’s recent book, The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society (Princeton University Press, 2016).

The collection is edited by Ryan Muldoon, and includes papers by Scott E. Page, David Wiens, Fred D'Agostino, Kevin Vallier, and Gerald Gaus. Lori Watson and yours truly also have a paper in it: “The Tyranny—or the Democracy—of the Ideal?”. Here is the abstract for our paper:

In this article we defend the 'Rawlsian' view of the nature of political philosophy, and especially the role of 'ideal theory' in thinking about justice, against some of Gerald Gaus's main criticisms in The Tyranny of the Ideal (Princeton University Press, 2016). First, we dispute Gaus's claim that Rawls's idea of a 'well-ordered society' cannot survive the move to political liberalism. We formulate a 'political liberal' version of the well-ordered society, and show that Gaus's 'Open Society,' rather than a radical alternative to the political liberal well-ordered society, in fact closely resembles it. We then challenge Gaus's claim that Rawlsians committed to the principles of 'justice as fairness' are confronted with 'The Choice.' According to The Choice, ideal theorists must either: (1) pursue 'nearby' relatively certain 'local' gains in justice for their society, or (2) forgo these local gains in order to pursue the more ambitious but far less certain goal of 'ideal' justice. (The goal of ideal justice is 'less certain' both in terms of its likely achievement as well as the likelihood that it is in fact the ideal.) We challenge Gaus's claim regarding The Choice, at least as applied to the Rawlsian view, by explaining how addressing local injustices naturally can lead some citizens to develop conceptions of full justice, including 'realistically utopian' versions of their societies. The kinds of political proposals that plausibly follow from this account of public reasoning indicate that Rawlsians in fact do not confront The Choice.

Kudos to Prof. Muldoon for putting this impressive volume together. And it is great that Cosmos + Taxis is free and online!

Political Utopias reviewed at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

As I mentioned last April, I have a chapter in the volume Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates (Oxford University Press, 2017), edited by Michael Weber and Kevin Vallier.

So I thought I would mention here that Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews has a (generally positive) review of the volume out now, written by Patick Taylor Smith (of National University of Singapore).

Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates

I’m delighted to have received my contributor’s copy of Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates, edited by Michael Weber and Kevin Vallier. The other contributors are: David Estlund, Gerald Gaus, Pablo Gilabert, Alexander Guerrero, Keith Hankins, Robert B. Talisse, Rosa Terlazzo, Laura Valentini, Danielle Wenner, and David Wiens.



Here is the description from the Oxford University Press website:

Political theory, from antiquity to the present, has been divided over the relationship between the requirements of justice and the limitations of persons and institutions to meet those requirements. Some theorists hold that a theory of justice should be utopian or idealistic--that the derivation of the correct principles of justice should not take into account human and institutional limitations. Others insist on a realist or non-utopian view, according to which feasibility--facts about what is possible given human and institutional limitations--is a constraint on principles of justice. In recent years, the relationship between the ideal and the real has become the subject of renewed scholarly interest. This anthology aims to represent the contemporary state of this classic debate. By and large, contributors to the volume deny that the choice between realism and idealism is binary. Rather, there is a continuum between realism and idealism that locates these extremes of each view at opposite poles. The contributors, therefore, tend to occupy middle positions, only leaning in the ideal or non-ideal direction. Together, their contributions not only represent a wide array of attractive positions in the new literature on the topic, but also collectively advance how we understand the difference between idealism and realism itself.

I’m pretty happy with the final version of my contribution (“Why Public Reasoning Involves Ideal Theorizing”). But the first draft of the paper, which I presented at the conference on Political Utopias at BGSU three years ago, was (to put it mildly) very rough. In fact, I thought that the presentation was a disaster, and contemplated (at least for a few hours) leaving academia forever. Thanks to helpful and friendly feedback at the conference, though, as well as at a subsequent presentation (at the APT), and from friends and colleagues kind enough to comment on later drafts (as well as anonymous referees for OUP), I feel pretty ‘okay’ with the published version of the essay. The whole experience was a helpful reminder of how vital exposing one’s ideas to others for critical feedback is for improving one’s philosophical work.

Here is the abstract for my paper:

Why Public Reasoning Involves Ideal Theorizing 

Some theorists—including Elizabeth Anderson, Gerald Gaus, and Amartya Sen—endorse versions of “public reason” as the appropriate way to justify political decisions while rejecting “ideal theory.” The chapter proposes that these ideas are not easily separated. The idea of public reason expresses a form of mutual “civic” respect for citizens. Public reason justifications for political proposals are addressed to citizens who would find acceptable those justifications, and consequently would comply freely with those proposals should they become law. Hence public reasoning involves “local ideal theorizing”: the justification of political proposals includes their consideration and evaluation under conditions of compliance with them by the citizens to whom those justifications are addressed. Local ideal theorizing, moreover, can lead to “full ideal theorizing,” wherein citizens outline and evaluate an amended version of their society’s “basic structure.” This argument is illustrated by some recent empirical work on inequality within the United States.

Finally, the book’s cover is quite beautiful (the image is from Thomas More’s original Utopia).

Kudos to Kevin and Michael on putting together such an excellent volume!

Political Utopias seminar reading schedule

I'm teaching a seminar on 'political utopias' and 'ideal theory' this term. The seminar is for advanced undergraduate and graduate students.  It meets for 150 minutes every week.  

Here is the course description:

Many philosophers from Plato onwards have formulated ‘political utopias,’ that is, accounts of ‘fully just’ societies. Such political utopias have been advanced as ‘models’ or ‘exemplars’ of political justice. The role of such models typically is twofold:

1. They are meant to help us evaluate critically our own societies, specifically, to help us identify the ways in which our existing political institutions and practices are unjust. 
2. To provide us with a ‘target’ or ‘end state’ for our political reforms or revolutionary efforts. 

In this course we will focus on two contemporary exercises in utopian theorizing:

1. John Rawls’s account of the ‘realist utopia’ of a liberal egalitarian ‘well-ordered society.’ 
2. G.A. Cohen’s account of a fully just socialist society.

We also will consider criticisms and defences of the views of Rawls and Cohen.
The course will conclude by looking at some recent exchanges over the role of ‘human nature’ and ‘feasibility’ in normative political philosophy.

Here is the schedule of required readings:

1. The main elements of political liberalism and justice as fairness (Feb. 2nd)

J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press), Parts I and II (pp. 1-79).

2. Rawls on justification, public reason, and political legitimacy (Feb. 9th)

J. Rawls (1997) “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review 64/3, pp. 765-807. (Republished in: J. Rawls (2005), Political Liberalism, pp. 440-490.)
J. Rawls (1995) “Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy 92/3, pp. 132-180. (Republished in: J. Rawls (2005), Political Liberalism, pp. 372-434.)

3. The institutions of a Rawlsian just society (Feb. 16th)

J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness, Parts IV and V (pp. 135-202).
R. Krouse and M. McPherson (1988) “Capitalism, ‘Property-Owning Democracy,’ and the Welfare State,” in Democracy and the Welfare State, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton University Press), pp. 79-105.

4. Rawls’s ‘realistic utopia’: a property-owning democracy (Feb. 23rd)

S. Freeman (2013) “Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference Principle,” Analyse & Kritik, 35/1, pp. 9-36.
T. Williamson and M. O’Neill (2009), “Property-Owning Democracy and the Demands of Justice,” Living Reviews in Democracy, pp. 1-10.
M. O’Neill (2012), “Free (and Fair) Markets without Capitalism,” in M. O’Neill and T. Williamson, eds., Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond (Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 75-100.
T. Williamson (2013) “Constitutionalizing Property-Owning Democracy,” Analyse & Kritik 35/1, pp. 237-253.

5. Alternatives to POD? Liberal socialism & welfare-state capitalism (March 1st)

K. Vallier (2014), “A moral and economic critique of the new property-owning democrats: on behalf of a Rawlsian welfare state,” Philosophical Studies (early online version).
R. Taylor (2014) “Illiberal Socialism,” Social Theory and Practice, July 2014, 40(3), pp. 433-60.
T. Malleson (2014), “Rawls, Property-Owning Democracy, and Democratic Socialism,” Journal of Social Philosophy 45, pp. 228-251.

6. Criticisms of Rawlsian ideal theory (March 8th)

C. Farrelly (2007) “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation,” Political Studies 55, pp. 844-864.
C. Mills (2005) “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” Hypatia (20), pp. 165-184.
A. Sen (2006) “What Do We Want From a Theory of Justice?” The Journal of Philosophy CIII/5, pp. 215-238.

7. Defences of Rawlsian ideal theory (March 22nd)

A. J. Simmons (2010) “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38/1, pp. 5-36.
A. Hamlin and Z. Stemplowska (2012) “Theory, Ideal Theory and The Theory of Ideals,” Political Studies Review 10/1, pp. 48-62.
B. Neufeld (forthcoming) “Why Public Reasoning Involves Ideal Theorizing,” in M. Weber and K. Vallier (eds.) Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates (Oxford University Press).

8. Not ideal enough?  Cohen’s critique of Rawlsian ideal theory (March 29th)

G.A. Cohen (2003) “Facts and Principles,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31/3, pp. 211-245.
M. Ronzoni and L. Valentini (2008) “On the Meta-ethical Status of Constructivism: Reflections on G.A. Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 7/4, pp. 403-422.

9. Cohen’s socialist utopia (April 5th)

G.A. Cohen (2009) Why Not Socialism? (Princeton University Press).

10. Debating Cohen’s socialist utopia 1 (April 12th)

R.J. Arneson (2015) “Why Not Capitalism?” in A. Kaufman (ed.) Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage: G.A. Cohen’s Egalitarianism (Cambridge University Press), pp. 207-234.
P. Gilabert (2011) “Feasibility and Socialism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 19, pp. 52-63.
M. Ronzoni (2012) “Life is not a camping trip – on the desirability of Cohenite socialism,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11/2, pp. 171-185.

11. Debating Cohen’s socialist utopia 2 (April 19th)

R. Miller (2010) “Relationships of Equality: A Camping Trip Revisited,” Journal of Ethics 14.
C.V. Schoelandt (2013) “Markets, Community, and Pluralism,” The Philosophical Quarterly (advance access).
A. Archer (2016) “Community, Pluralism, and Individualistic Pursuits: A Defense of Why Not Socialism?” Social Theory and Practice 42.

12. Human nature and the demands of justice (April 26th)

D. Estlund (2011) “Human Nature and the Limits (if Any) of Political Philosophy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39/3, pp. 207-237.
D. Wiens (2015) “Motivational Limitations on the Demands of Justice,” European Journal of Political Theory (online first version).
D. Estlund (2015) “Reply to Wiens,” European Journal of Political Theory.
D. Wiens (2015) “Rejoinder to Estlund,” unpublished note.

13. Feasibility, justice, and ‘utopophobia’ (May 3rd)

A. Gheaus (2013) “The Feasibility Constraint on the Concept of Justice,” The Philosophical Quarterly 63/252, pp. 445-464.
D. Wiens (2014) “‘Going Evaluative’ to Save Justice from Feasibility – A Pyrrhic Victory,” The Philosophical Quarterly 64/255, pp. 301-307.
D. Estlund (2014) “Utopophobia,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 42/2, pp. 113-134.

Optional readings:

I plan to provide a list of optional readings as well. (Any suggestions would be most welcome!) I probably will post the optional readings here when I have them sorted.