What is this blog about?


What is this blog about?

I am a political philosopher. My 'political philosophy' is a form of 'liberal egalitarianism.' So in this blog I reflect on various issues in political philosophy and politics (especially Canadian and American politics) from a liberal egalitarian perspective.

If you are curious about what I mean by 'liberal egalitarianism,' my views are strongly influenced by the conception of justice advanced by John Rawls. (So I sometimes refer to myself as a 'Rawlsian,' even though I disagree with Rawls on some matters.)

Astonishingly, I am paid to write and teach moral and political philosophy. I somehow manage to do this despite my akratic nature. Here is my faculty profile.

Showing posts with label teaching. Show all posts
Showing posts with label teaching. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 28, 2016

A creative way to address the prospect of guns in the classroom

In 2017 it looks like some Wisconsin GOP legislators will be pushing (yet again) for a law that would permit people to bring concealed firearms into campus buildings within the University of Wisconsin system. This is a terrible idea that just won't die (at least not while Republicans remain the enthusiastic thralls of the National Rifle Association).

Professor Larry Shapiro (UW-Madison), however, is planning on pursuing a rather innovative strategy for dealing with this problem (should the proposed bill eventually become law). He's preparing two syllabi for his "Introduction to Philosophy" course. The first syllabus includes a wide variety of topics, among them things like whether God exists, the moral permissibility or impermissibility of abortion, and conceptions of social justice. The second syllabus eliminates those topics and replaces them with philosophical debates less likely to provoke strong reactions in students.

Why the two syllabi? Prof. Shapiro explains:
The reason for the second syllabus is this. The topics on the first syllabus that get my students so excited are also the topics that arouse the most passion. And, if some of our state legislators have their way, passion is the last thing I’ll want to provoke in my students. You see, my campus may soon become a concealed carry campus. This means that while I am presenting an argument in favor of a right to abortion, or against the existence of God, or in favor of tax policies that would strip these students of their inheritances (I also present arguments on the other side of these issues), I will at the same time be worrying that a depressed or disturbed or drunk or high college student is in the audience, armed, and fed up with what I or fellow students are advocating. 
It’s of course obvious that gun violence in my classroom is far more probable given the legal presence of guns than not, and even if the danger remains remote, why should I bother to keep on my syllabus those issues that promise most likely to incite gun violence? Why teach topics that increase the probability, however small, of provoking an unstable but legally carrying shooter? 
So, my plan is this. On the first day of the semester I will explain to my students that I have prepared two syllabi for the course. One they’ll find much more interesting than the other, but we’ll adopt it only if I receive a promise from the students that they will not carry weapons into my classroom.
(Read the whole piece by Prof. Shapiro here. [Hat tip to the Daily Nous.])

I formulated a less creative strategy to deal with this problem when the idea was proposed last time (during autumn 2015): (a) switch all my lower-level undergraduate courses to online only; (b) hold my office hours in an off-campus coffee shop with a 'no guns' policy; and (c) request all students in my seminars (mainly graduate students and 4th-year undergraduates) not bring guns to our meetings (I would trust that students that mature would honour this request). But perhaps I'll adapt a version of Prof. Shapiro's strategy as well.

(In an earlier post at this blog, I explained why the possession of firearms actually renders everyone within American society less free.)

Monday, February 1, 2016

Political Utopias seminar reading schedule


I'm teaching a seminar on 'political utopias' and 'ideal theory' this term. The seminar is for advanced undergraduate and graduate students.  It meets for 150 minutes every week.  

Here is the course description:
Many philosophers from Plato onwards have formulated ‘political utopias,’ that is, accounts of ‘fully just’ societies. Such political utopias have been advanced as ‘models’ or ‘exemplars’ of political justice. The role of such models typically is twofold:
  1. They are meant to help us evaluate critically our own societies, specifically, to help us identify the ways in which our existing political institutions and practices are unjust. 
  2. To provide us with a ‘target’ or ‘end state’ for our political reforms or revolutionary efforts. 
In this course we will focus on two contemporary exercises in utopian theorizing:
  1. John Rawls’s account of the ‘realist utopia’ of a liberal egalitarian ‘well-ordered society.’ 
  2. G.A. Cohen’s account of a fully just socialist society.
We also will consider criticisms and defences of the views of Rawls and Cohen.
The course will conclude by looking at some recent exchanges over the role of ‘human nature’ and ‘feasibility’ in normative political philosophy.
Here is the schedule of required readings:

1. The main elements of political liberalism and justice as fairness (Feb. 2nd)

J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press), Parts I and II (pp. 1-79).

2. Rawls on justification, public reason, and political legitimacy (Feb. 9th)

J. Rawls (1997) “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review 64/3, pp. 765-807. (Republished in: J. Rawls (2005), Political Liberalism, pp. 440-490.)
J. Rawls (1995) “Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy 92/3, pp. 132-180. (Republished in: J. Rawls (2005), Political Liberalism, pp. 372-434.)

3. The institutions of a Rawlsian just society (Feb. 16th)

J. Rawls (2001) Justice as Fairness, Parts IV and V (pp. 135-202).
R. Krouse and M. McPherson (1988) “Capitalism, ‘Property-Owning Democracy,’ and the Welfare State,” in Democracy and the Welfare State, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton University Press), pp. 79-105.

4. Rawls’s ‘realistic utopia’: a property-owning democracy (Feb. 23rd)

S. Freeman (2013) “Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference Principle,” Analyse & Kritik, 35/1, pp. 9-36.
T. Williamson and M. O’Neill (2009), “Property-Owning Democracy and the Demands of Justice,” Living Reviews in Democracy, pp. 1-10.
M. O’Neill (2012), “Free (and Fair) Markets without Capitalism,” in M. O’Neill and T. Williamson, eds., Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond (Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 75-100.
T. Williamson (2013) “Constitutionalizing Property-Owning Democracy,” Analyse & Kritik 35/1, pp. 237-253.

5. Alternatives to POD? Liberal socialism & welfare-state capitalism (March 1st)

K. Vallier (2014), “A moral and economic critique of the new property-owning democrats: on behalf of a Rawlsian welfare state,” Philosophical Studies (early online version).
R. Taylor (2014) “Illiberal Socialism,” Social Theory and Practice, July 2014, 40(3), pp. 433-60.
T. Malleson (2014), “Rawls, Property-Owning Democracy, and Democratic Socialism,” Journal of Social Philosophy 45, pp. 228-251.

6. Criticisms of Rawlsian ideal theory (March 8th)

C. Farrelly (2007) “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation,” Political Studies 55, pp. 844-864.
C. Mills (2005) “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” Hypatia (20), pp. 165-184.
A. Sen (2006) “What Do We Want From a Theory of Justice?” The Journal of Philosophy CIII/5, pp. 215-238.

7. Defences of Rawlsian ideal theory (March 22nd)

A. J. Simmons (2010) “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38/1, pp. 5-36.
A. Hamlin and Z. Stemplowska (2012) “Theory, Ideal Theory and The Theory of Ideals,” Political Studies Review 10/1, pp. 48-62.
B. Neufeld (forthcoming) “Why Public Reasoning Involves Ideal Theorizing,” in M. Weber and K. Vallier (eds.) Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates (Oxford University Press).


8. Not ideal enough?  Cohen’s critique of Rawlsian ideal theory (March 29th)

G.A. Cohen (2003) “Facts and Principles,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31/3, pp. 211-245.
M. Ronzoni and L. Valentini (2008) “On the Meta-ethical Status of Constructivism: Reflections on G.A. Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 7/4, pp. 403-422.

9. Cohen’s socialist utopia (April 5th)

G.A. Cohen (2009) Why Not Socialism? (Princeton University Press).

10. Debating Cohen’s socialist utopia 1 (April 12th)

R.J. Arneson (2015) “Why Not Capitalism?” in A. Kaufman (ed.) Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage: G.A. Cohen’s Egalitarianism (Cambridge University Press), pp. 207-234.
P. Gilabert (2011) “Feasibility and Socialism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 19, pp. 52-63.
M. Ronzoni (2012) “Life is not a camping trip – on the desirability of Cohenite socialism,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11/2, pp. 171-185.

11. Debating Cohen’s socialist utopia 2 (April 19th)

R. Miller (2010) “Relationships of Equality: A Camping Trip Revisited,” Journal of Ethics 14.
C.V. Schoelandt (2013) “Markets, Community, and Pluralism,” The Philosophical Quarterly (advance access).
A. Archer (2016) “Community, Pluralism, and Individualistic Pursuits: A Defense of Why Not Socialism?” Social Theory and Practice 42.


12. Human nature and the demands of justice (April 26th)

D. Estlund (2011) “Human Nature and the Limits (if Any) of Political Philosophy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39/3, pp. 207-237.
D. Wiens (2015) “Motivational Limitations on the Demands of Justice,” European Journal of Political Theory (online first version).
D. Estlund (2015) “Reply to Wiens,” European Journal of Political Theory.
D. Wiens (2015) “Rejoinder to Estlund,” unpublished note.

13. Feasibility, justice, and ‘utopophobia’ (May 3rd)

A. Gheaus (2013) “The Feasibility Constraint on the Concept of Justice,” The Philosophical Quarterly 63/252, pp. 445-464.
D. Wiens (2014) “‘Going Evaluative’ to Save Justice from Feasibility – A Pyrrhic Victory,” The Philosophical Quarterly 64/255, pp. 301-307.
D. Estlund (2014) “Utopophobia,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 42/2, pp. 113-134.

Optional readings:

I plan to provide a list of optional readings as well. (Any suggestions would be most welcome!) I probably will post the optional readings here when I have them sorted.


Thursday, January 28, 2016

History of liberalism course (Spring 2016)

The course that I've taught the most since I arrived at UWM in 2008 is "Political Philosophy." I teach the course as the "history of liberalism." Since the course is only one term long, though, I have to leave out some significant figures (Smith, Wollstonecraft, Burke, Constant, Hegel), and I provide only limited coverage of others (Hume, Kant, Marx). It's frustrating, but such is life. I don't see how I can fit any more readings into the course, which already is quite heavy.

This term, for the first time, I've removed Nozick from the course. I decided to use some selections from Hayek instead. One reason for this is that I wanted to reduce the overlap with a second year course that I also teach from time to time ("Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy"). I'll continue to teach Nozick in that second year course. (In my experience, not many students take both courses, but enough do that I don't want there to be too much overlap in the courses' required readings.) A second reason why I've removed Nozick is simply that I'm quite tired of teaching his version of libertarianism, which I find thoroughly implausible. (Hume effectively refuted it two centuries earlier.) Hayek, in contrast, is still worth taking seriously, in my judgement, but does not receive as much attention as he should.

In any case, for anyone who might be curious, here is the reading schedule for the course. (I've left out the various assignments, tests, review sessions, and so forth. Each meeting is 75 minutes long.)

THE CLASSICAL SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES

Thomas Hobbes: The First ‘Modern’ Political Philosopher

Jan. 28. T. Hobbes, Leviathan (selections), pp. 12-26.
Feb. 02. T. Hobbes, Leviathan (selections), pp. 26-51.
Feb. 04. T. Hobbes – conclusion + review (no new readings).

John Locke: The Architect of Classical Liberalism

Feb. 09. J. Locke, Second Treatise On Government, Chapters I-IV.
Feb. 11. J. Locke, Second Treatise On Government, Chapters V-IX.
Feb. 16. J. Locke, Second Treatise On Government, Chapters X-XIX.

David Hume versus Locke on Property

Feb. 18. D. Hume, “Of Justice.”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Champion of Equality and Democratic Self-Government

Feb. 23. J. J. Rousseau, “On the Origin of Inequality.”
Feb. 25. J. J. Rousseau, On The Social Contract, Book I.
Mar. 01. J. J. Rousseau, On The Social Contract, Book II.
Mar. 08. J. J. Rousseau, On The Social Contract, Books III [excluding Ch. 8] and IV [excluding Chs. 4, 5, 7].
HUME’S CRITICISM OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND KANT’S REPLY

Mar. 22. D. Hume, “Of the Original Contract.”  I. Kant, “The Contractual Basis for a Just Society.”

UTILITARIANISM: LIBERALISM WITHOUT CONTRACT

Jeremy Bentham: Social Reformer and ‘Philosophical Radical’

Mar. 24. J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (selection).  J. Rawls, “Classical Utilitarianism.”

John Stuart Mill: Utilitarian Champion of Liberty and Liberal Feminist

Mar. 29. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, chapters 2 [pp. 238-59] and 5 [pp. 277-301].
Mar. 31. J.S. Mill, On Liberty, chapter 1 [pp. 3-16], chapter 2 [pp. 17-22; 36-49; 54-56], and chapter 3 [pp. 57-76].  J. Kleinig, “Two Arguments for State Paternalism.”
Apr. 05. J.S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, chapter 1 [pp. 123-52].  H. Taylor, “The Enfranchisement of Women.”

MARXISM: LIBERALISM AS CAPITALIST IDEOLOGY

Apr. 07 K. Marx and F. Engels, “The Socialist Ideal.”
Apr. 12 K. Marx and F. Engels, “The Socialist Ideal.”

20TH CENTURY LIBERALISM

John Rawls: High Liberalism and the Return of the Social Contract

Apr. 14. Selections from J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
Apr. 19. Selections from J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.

Susan Okin: Feminism and High Liberalism

Apr. 21. S. M. Okin, “The Family: Gender and Justice.”
Apr. 26. J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997), Section 5 only (pp. 787-794).

F.A. Hayek: Back to Classical Liberalism?

Apr. 26. F. A. Hayek, “Freedom and Coercion.”
Apr. 28. F. A. Hayek, “‘Social’ or Distributive Justice.”
May. 03. A. Lister, “The ‘Mirage’ of Social Justice: Hayek Against (And For) Rawls.”


Friday, October 30, 2015

An armed society is an unfree society

[Image from here.]

















Having decided that they haven’t quite ruined the University the Wisconsin system enough yet, the Republicans in Madison are now are considering a bill that would allow students (if they have ‘conceal and carry’ permits) to bring guns into campus buildings.  Students sitting in classrooms during lectures and seminars, or in offices meeting with professors, may soon be packing heat.

This is a horrible idea, one manifestly harmful to the educational mission of universities, including especially the free and vigorous exchange of controversial ideas and views.  Moreover, it is premised on false beliefs about the role of guns in reducing violent crime, and a misguided conception of the relation between guns and freedom in society.

It sometimes is claimed by American gun advocates (including the two legislators pushing this bill) that the presence of guns reduce violent crimes.  The reasoning seems to be that guns act as deterrents to criminals and/or can be used by ‘good guys’ to stop ‘bad guys’ (to use some technical terms favoured by the NRA) in the process of harming or killing innocent people.

That this claim is false should be obvious to anyone who bothers to look at other liberal democratic societies.  The United States has six times as many firearm homicides as Canada, and over fifteen times as many as Australia and New Zealand.  The reason for this is clear: “The US is an outlier on gun violence because it has way more guns than other developed nations.”  An American gun advocate might acknowledge this fact, but claim that guns nonetheless reduce the overall homicide rate.  That is, perhaps once homicides not caused by firearms are taken into account, it turns out that the United States has a lower homicide rate than, say, Canada thanks to the deterrent effect of all those guns.  But this is not the case either.  The homicide rate of the United States is three times that of Canada.  Again, this should be no surprise.  It’s a lot easier to kill people with guns than with hockey sticks.  Simply put, the idea that citizens legally permitted to carry concealed firearms are an effective force in reducing homicides is a myth.

Guns are inherently threatening.  If students are allowed to bring guns into classrooms, many other students will feel less safe.  It already is quite difficult to help students feel comfortable enough to discuss freely – and disagree openly with each other over – contentious issues like race, gender, and economic inequality, or the moral permissibility or impermissibility of abortion and euthanasia.  The presence of guns lurking in the background of future such discussions invariably will make them even more difficult.

The debate over gun control, at least within the United States, often is cast as a conflict between the values of ‘freedom’ and ‘welfare’ (or security).  Even defenders of robust gun control frequently characterize the debate in this way.  This is a mistake.  The debate instead should be construed as one concerning the distribution of freedom.  Should the freedom of gun owners take priority over the freedom of citizens in general?

The science fiction author Robert Heinlein once famously declared, “An armed society is a polite society.” But the reason such a society is ‘polite,’ of course, is fear.  (The second sentence of the Heinlein quote is: “Manners are good when one may have to back up his acts with his life.”)  The reality is that an armed society is an unfree society.

The threat of gun violence is coercive.  While easy access to firearms may expand the scope of (what the political theorist Isaiah Berlin famously called) the ‘negative liberty’ of those who like to carry around guns (such citizens can do something that they could not do, or not do as easily, in a society in which access to firearms was restricted), it restricts the scope of all citizens’ negative liberty.  It does so by introducing a coercive threat into all citizens’ public interactions.

To connect my discussion here with my previous post, a society in which guns are widely available is one that more closely resembles Thomas Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’ than do societies in which guns are rare.*  That is, making guns readily available creates a more miserable and insecure condition, one in which everyone becomes a potential threat to everyone else.  Such a society is less free overall; its citizens face a greater range of interferences (potential threats) than citizens in unarmed societies.

Of the four countries that I’ve lived in as an adult – Canada (where I’m from), England, Ireland, and the United States – I’ve felt the least free within the U.S., despite its self-conception as ‘the land of the free.’  And the prevalence of guns in the U.S. is one of the main reasons for this.  In Canada, if an argument breaks out in a coffee shop, a pub, or on a street, I think: “Ugh – How annoying.”  In the U.S., when the same sort of thing happens, I think: “Bloody hell! What if one of those idiots has a gun?!”  And I flee.

Keith Humphreys, professor of psychiatry and behavioural medicine at Stanford University, describes precisely this phenomenon: “In the U.S., whenever there is a angry argument, whether over a traffic accident, someone being fired from their job, or for that matter over nothing of any consequence, it always lurks in one’s mind that someone could have a gun and could start shooting.”  He describes this as “the oppressive psychological weight of America’s gun violence,” and explains how (perversely) this psychological weight “is part of what makes some gun owners scared of gun control (If I don’t have a gun, how will I defend myself against those who do?).”  (Notice the paradigmatically Hobbesian reasoning of the gun owner described by Humphreys.)

And now some Wisconsin legislators want to allow guns into university buildings, including classrooms.  Classrooms in which controversial ideas are debated, and feelings can become intense.  Classrooms in which professors sometimes have to give students bad grades.

Well, at least explaining Hobbes's version of the state of nature will be a bit easier in my political philosophy courses if the legislators who cravenly are doing the bidding of the NRA in Madison get their way…



[* Allow me address a potential nitpick for any Hobbes scholars who might be reading this.  The state of nature, according to Hobbes, is a state of complete freedom, as there is no political authority to establish and impose laws upon persons.  But if we employ Berlin’s notion of negative liberty – according to which, roughly, interferences to potential courses of action count as restrictions on one’s freedom, irrespective of whether they are brought about by the state or by non-state agents – then people are quite unfree within the state of nature, as they face all kinds of interferences on what they can do, namely, continual threats from others.  It is this fear of others that compels rational individuals within the state of nature to act in certain ways (namely, to take pre-emptive actions against others whenever possible).  This is why within the state of nature there is “continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”  If we employ something like Berlin’s concept of negative liberty, then, the Hobbesian state of nature is a radically unfree condition.]